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The Crime Victims' Rights Act (CVRA) of 2004 is the most im-
portant legislation to advance crime victims' rights enacted in
the United States in the last decade. While the CVRA strength-
ens existing federal crime victims' rights provisions, its most im-
portant contribution is the creation of a judicial enforcement
regime, including standing for crime victims to transform often
illusory crime victims' rights into meaningful, enforceable
rights.
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I. Introduction
Until the crime victims' rights movement became a potent
force for reform, official recognition and response to the special
needs of crime victims typically was very limited. The coalition
of groups and individuals most passionate about enacting a
Federal constitutional amendment, or failing that, broad legis-
lation with effective enforcement provisions was and continues
to consist primarily of victims of serious, violent crimes and
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their families.1 Their experience with the criminal justice sys-
tem failed to bring them closure or any sense of justice.2
The crime victims' rights movement has revealed legiti-
mate and serious shortcomings within our criminal justice sys-
tem. Crime victims have complained of insensitive treatment
by police, prosecutors, and other criminal justice officials; inad-
equate protective measures, absence of meaningful restitution,
compensation or other assistance; and have been mostly ex-
cluded from participating in the criminal justice process, except
in their role as witnesses. Police and prosecutors often neglect
to include victims in the various phases of investigation and
prosecution, make decisions affecting the crime victims without
informing or consulting them, and impose a "secondary harm"3
on crime victims that adds to the injury already suffered.
Victims' rights advocates argue that the harm to which vic-
tims are exposed during the trial process, in addition to the
original harm suffered from the crime, justifies giving crime vic-
tims rights independent from those of police and prosecutors.
Criminal proceedings will ultimately be aided because crime
victims are often the most important source of information
available to police, prosecutors, judges, and juries. Thus, vic-
tims' cooperation is likely to be significantly improved if given
meaningful and enforceable rights.
1. See National Victims' Constitutional Amendment Passage, http://www.nv-
cap.org/ (last visited July 12, 2008) (listing supporters of victims' amendment
project).
2. See Jon Kyl, Steven J. Twist, & Stephen Higgins, On the Wings of Their
Angels: The Scott Campbell, Stephanie Roper, Wendy Preston, Louarna Gillis, Nila
Lynn Crime Victims' Rights Act, 9 LEWIS & CLARK L. REV. 581, 583 (2005) ("The
victims' rights movement seeks to end the unjust treatment of crime victims by
reforming the culture of the criminal justice system in the federal government and
the states.").
3. Douglas E. Beloof, The Third Model of Criminal Process: The Victim Partic-
ipation Model, 1999 UTAH L. REV. 289, 293-96 (1999). Beloof states:
The fundamental justification for providing due-process-like rights of partic-
ipation (and other types of rights) is to prevent the two kinds of harm to
which the victim is exposed. The first harm is primary harm, which results
from the crime itself. The other harm is secondary harm, which comes from
governmental processes and governmental actors within those processes.
Id. at 294.
2008]
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The Crime Victims' Rights Act ("CVRA") of 20044 is the
most important legislation to advance crime victims' rights en-
acted in the United States in the last decade. The CVRA can be
distinguished from earlier federal legislation and most state
constitutional amendments and statutes in three areas: (1) ex-
tending rights and remedies to victims of all misdemeanors as
well as felonies; (2) expanding participatory rights at critical
stages of the criminal justice process; and, most significantly,
(3) providing a judicial enforcement regime that grants stand-
ing to crime victims to appeal a violation of their rights immedi-
ately after the violation occurs to federal appellate courts, to be
heard within seventy-two hours. In addition, the CVRA autho-
rizes appellate courts to halt the trial proceedings for up to five
days while an appeal is being heard and, if the relief sought is
denied, requires appellate courts to clearly state the reasons for
the denial in a written opinion.
.This article discusses the CVRA-its rights, remedies, and
likely impact on the priorities and roles of other criminal justice
actors. Key issues are identified that will need to be resolved by
the courts interpreting the CVRA or perhaps by Congressional
amendment. In addition, because Congress intended the CVRA
to serve as a model for reform of state victims' rights constitu-
tions and statutes, illustrative state provisions are compared. 5
II. Evolution of Federal Victims' Rights Legislation
A. Pre-CVRA Federal Legislation
The victims' rights movement in the United States has un-
dergone three distinct stages. Throughout the first stage, oc-
curring approximately from the early 1970s through the early
1980s, crime victims' rights advocates sought statutory recogni-
tion of new rights, including the right to restitution; more hu-
mane treatment by police, prosecutors and other criminal
justice administrative officials; and participatory rights in the
criminal justice process. During the second stage, starting with
4. Scott Campbell, Stephanie Roper, Wendy Preston, Louarna Gillis, and Nila
Lynn Crime Victims' Rights Act, Pub. L. No. 108-405 (codified as amended at 18
U.S.C. §3771 (2004)).
5. See Kyl et al., supra note 2, at 593 ("Congress intends the CVRA to trans-
form the federal criminal justice system's treatment of crime victims and to serve
as a model for reform of the criminal justice legal culture in the fifty states.").
[Vol. 28:623626
4https://digitalcommons.pace.edu/plr/vol28/iss4/2
20081 NEW RIGHTS AND REMEDIES 627
the 1982 Report of the President's Task Force on Victims of
Crime6 that contained sixty-six recommendations including a
proposed federal constitutional amendment, crime victims'
rights advocates sought constitutional recognition of these
rights, resulting in thirty-two state constitutional amend-
ments.7 The present day third stage seeks to give additional
meaning to these rights by providing effective legal remedies.8
During the last twenty-five years, federal legislation has
been enacted in response to demands to meet the basic needs of
crime victims and to recognize their rights. 9 The first major fed-
eral victims' rights law was the Victim and Witness Protection
6. OFFICE FOR VICTIMS OF CRIME, PRESIDENT'S TASK FORCE ON VICTIMS OF
CRIME: FINAL REPORT (1982), http://www.ojp.usdoj.gov/ovc/publications/presdnts
tskforcrprt87299.pdf. On April 23, 1982, President Ronald Reagan issued Execu-
tive Order 12360, establishing the President's Task Force on Victims of Crime.
The Task Force conducted a nationwide study to assess the treatment of crime
victims in the criminal justice system. Its members were unanimous in their find-
ings that the criminal justice system regularly revictimized victims and that the
system was out of balance in favor of offenders. Their final report included sixty-
eight recommendations for action in five areas: (1) proposed executive and legisla-
tive action at the federal and state levels; (2) proposed federal action; (3) proposed
action for criminal justice system agencies, including police, prosecutors, the judi-
ciary, and parole boards; (4) proposed action for other organizations, including hos-
pitals, the ministry, the Bar, schools, the mental health community, and the
private sector; and (5) a proposed amendment to the Federal Constitution. Melissa
Hook & Jane Seymour, A Retrospective of the 1982 President's Task Force on Vic-
tims of Crime, Office for Victims of Crime, December, 2004, http://www.ojp.usdoj.
gov/ovc/ncvrw/2005/pg4d.html.
7. See National Victims' Constitutional Amendment Passage, supra note 1
(citing AL, AK, AZ, CA, CO, CT, FL, ID, IL, IN, KS, LA, MD, MI, MS, MO, NE, NV,
NJ, NM, NC, OH, OK, OR, RI, SC, TN, TX, UT, VA, WA, and WI as states that
have adopted victims' rights amendments). See also Office for Victims of Crime,
National Victim Assistance Academy, http://www.ojp.usdoj.gov/ov/assist/vaa.htm
(last visited July 12, 2008) (documenting dates and voter approval for state consti-
tutional amendments for victims' rights until 1996). In addition, Montana does
not have a victims' rights amendment to its constitution. However, in 1998, Mon-
tana voters approved a constitutional amendment broadening the purposes of the
criminal justice system to include restitution to crime victims. If Montana were
included, the total number of states enacting a victims' rights constitutional
amendment is thirty-three. See National Victims' Constitutional Amendment Pas-
sage, supra note 1. For information about other state victims' rights constitutional
amendments, see id.
8. Douglas E. Beloof, The Third Wave of Crime Victims' Rights: Standing,
Remedy, and Review, 2005 BYU L. REV. 255, 257, 342 [hereinafter Beloof, The
Third Wave]. See also DOUGLAS E. BELOOF, PAUL G. CASSELL, & STEVEN J. TwIST,
VICTIMS IN CRIMINAL PROCEDURE 769 (2d ed. 2006).
9. See Kyl, supra note 2, at 584-88 (2005), for a summary of legislation at the
federal and state levels.
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Act of 1982,10 which provided restitution for crime victims, al-
lowed the use of victim-impact statements at sentencing hear-
ings and encouraged states to establish programs to serve crime
victims. Congress expanded the provisions of this act through
the Victims of Crime Act of 1984,11 creating the Crime Victims
Fund and the Office for Victims of Crimes in the Department of
Justice. The Crime Control Act of 199012 mandated a variety of
services for victims. Congress subsequently enacted the
Mandatory Victims Restitution Act of 1996,13 expanding the
crime victims' right to restitution.
The Victims' Rights and Restitution Act of 199014 contrib-
uted the most to recognizing crime victims' rights prior to enact-
ment of the CVRA. The Act's "Bill of Rights" guaranteed crime
victims the following : (1) to be treated fairly and with respect
for the victim's dignity and privacy; (2) to be reasonably pro-
tected from the accused offender; (3) to be notified of court pro-
ceedings; (4) to be present at all public court proceedings related
to the offense, unless the court determines that testimony by
the victims would be materially affected if the victim heard
other testimony at trial; (5) to confer with the attorney for the
Government in the case; (6) to restitution; and (7) to informa-
tion about the conviction, sentencing, imprisonment, and re-
lease of the offender. 15 The remedy provided in Section 502 of
the Victims' Rights and Restitution Act of 1990 was that federal
officials, "shall make their best efforts to see that victims of
crime are accorded the rights described" in the Act.16
Four years later, Congress passed the Violent Crime Con-
trol and Law Enforcement Act of 1994,17 which encompassed
10. Victim and Witness Protection Act of 1982, Pub. L. No. 97-291, 96 Stat.
1248 (codified as amended at 18 U.S.C. §§ 1512-1514, 3679-3580) (1982)).
11. Victims of Crime Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-473, 98 Stat. 2170 (codified as
amended at 42 U.S.C. § 10601 (1984)).
12. Crime Control Act of 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-647, 104 Stat. 4789 (codified as
amended at 18 U.S.C. § 922(q) (1990)).
13. Mandatory Victims Restitution Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-132, tit. IIA,
110 Stat. 1227 (codified as amended at 18 U.S.C. § 3663(a) (1996)).
14. Victims' Rights and Restitution Act of 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-647, 104 Stat.
4820 (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. § 10606 (1990)).
15. 42 U.S.C. § 10606(b).
16. Id. § 10606(a).
17. Violent Crime Control and Law Enforcement Act of 1994, Pub. L. No. 103-
322, 108 Stat. 1796 (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. §§ 13701-14223 (1994)).
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6https://digitalcommons.pace.edu/plr/vol28/iss4/2
NEW RIGHTS AND REMEDIES
several new provisions for victims, including the right of domes-
tic violence victims to be heard at the defendants' pretrial re-
lease hearings and the right of violent crime and sexual abuse
victims to allocute at sentencing.' 8 The Act also mandated res-
titution for sexually exploited and abused children and victims
of domestic violence and sexual assault.19
The trial of Timothy McVeigh, charged with responsibility
for the April, 1995 bombing of the Murrah Building in
Oklahoma City, Oklahoma, which resulted in the death of 168
persons, dramatically spotlighted a significant limitation of the
Victims' Rights and Restitution Act of 1990-the lack of an ef-
fective enforcement mechanism. Surviving victims of the bomb-
ing, who were scheduled to testify at sentencing, sought to
exercise their right to attend the trial. The victims were barred
from attending the trial. The Government appealed to the
Tenth Circuit, which held that the statute did not "grant stand-
ing to seek review of orders relating to matters covered by the
Act."20 The Tenth Circuit noted that the statute "'does not cre-
ate a cause of action or defense in favor of any persons arising
out of the failure to accord to a victim the rights enumerated."' 21
However, the Tenth Circuit stated that it did not categorically
rule out the possibility of mandamus relief for the government
in the event of a patently unauthorized and pernicious ruling by
the trial judge.22
In response to the public's dissatisfaction with the surviv-
ing victims' exclusion from the Oklahoma City bombing trial,
the Victim Rights Clarifications Act of 199723 was enacted. It
established the victim's right to attend trial even if the victim
will also speak at sentencing. This right, however, is not abso-
lute. The victim may only attend the trial assuming that no
other statute, rule, or provision of law requires that the victim
be excluded.24
18. Id.
19. Id.
20. United States v. McVeigh, 106 F.3d 325, 335 (10th Cir. 1997).
21. Id. (quoting 42 U.S.C. § 10603(c)).
22. Id. at 333
23. Victim Rights Clarification Act of 1997, Pub. L. No 105-6, 111 Stat. 12
(codified as amended at 18 U.S.C. § 3510 (1997)).
24. Id.
2008] 629
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B. Circumstances Leading to the Enactment of the CVRA
A coalition of groups and individuals were passionate about
enacting a Federal constitutional amendment, or, failing that,
broad legislation with effective enforcement provisions. Among
the various supporters, three groups of crime victim advocates
with differing priorities played a prominent role: (1) family
members and friends of homicide victims; 25 (2) sexual assault
victims, their family, and friends and victims of domestic vio-
lence, including victims of spousal and child sexual abuse;26 and
(3) family members and friends of persons who were killed or
seriously injured by drunk drivers. 27
These groups and individuals have benefited from the
scholarly contributions, organizing activities, strategic gui-
dance, and political contacts of leaders of the contemporary vic-
tims' rights movement. In particular, three persons outside of
the executive and legislative branches made important contri-
butions in the battle to obtain Congressional support for a fed-
eral victims' rights constitutional amendment, which ultimately
led to the legislative enactment of the CVRA: Professor Douglas
E. Beloof;28 Professor and former United States District Judge
25. See, e.g., National Organization of Parents of Murdered Children, http://
www.pomc.org/ (last visited July 12, 2008).
26. See, e.g., Illinois Coalition Against Sexual Assault, http://www.icasa.org/
home.aspx?PageID=500& (last visited July 12, 2008); Pennsylvania Coalition
Against Rape, http://www.pcar.org/ (last visited July 12, 2008); The Justice League
of Ohio, http://www.thejusticeleagueohio.org/ (last visited July 12, 2008); National
Sexual Violence Resource Center, http://www.nsvrc.org/ (last visited July 12,
2008); Iowa Coalition Against Sexual Assault, http://www.iowacasa.org/ (last vis-
ited July 12, 2008). Additional information on the activities and programs of other
organizations and the federal government can be obtained from: (1) the Office on
Violence Against Women, U.S. Department of Justice, 800 K Street, N.W., Suite
920, Washington, D.C. 20530; (2) the National Crime Victim Law Institute, 10015
SW Terwilliger Boulevard, Portland, Oregon 97219-7799.
27. See, e.g., Mothers Against Drunk Driving, http://www.madd.org/ (last vis-
ited July 12, 2008).
28. Professor of Law, Lewis & Clark Law School and former Executive Direc-
tor, National Crime Victim Law Institute. Representatives of victims' rights
groups, state and local prosecutor offices, victims' rights offices, crime victim re-
source and service centers, law professors, the ABA Victims Committee, and the
U.S. Department of Justice have met annually for the last seven years at the Na-
tional Crime Victim Law Institute Law and Litigation Conference at Lewis &
Clark Law School for educational sessions and to explore constitutional, legisla-
tive, and litigation strategies.
630
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Paul Cassell;29 and legal activist and strategist, Steven J.
Twist.30
The enactment of the CVRA in its present form is largely a
result of the leadership and advocacy both of crime victims'
rights groups and the strong bipartisan support of United
States Senators Jon Kyl (R-Arizona), Dianne Feinstein (D-Cali-
fornia), and other congressional supporters. In addition, the
CVRA received White House support; however, input from the
professional staff of the U.S. Department of Justice was limited.
Because legislation can be amended and funding can be re-
stricted, legislators and others with reservations about certain
provisions of the CVRA viewed the CVRA as preferable to the
proposed, and more permanent, amendment to the United
States Constitution, which had strong support in Congress. 31
Senate sponsors of the federal constitutional amendment set-
tled for a statutory alternative after realizing that a constitu-
tional amendment did not have the votes necessary to pass.32
29. Professor of Law, University of Utah, and, formerly, United States Dis-
trict Court Judge for the District of Utah (Mar. 13, 2002-Nov. 5, 2007).
30. Adjunct Professor, Arizona State University College of Law and General
Counsel for the National Victims Constitutional Amendment Project. Professor
Twist participated in the crafting of the final version of the Federal Victim Rights
Bill. See National Organization for Victim Assistance, "Breathtaking" Statute
Adopted in Near Silence - Federal Victim Rights Bill Enacted 1, available at http:l!
humanright.go.kr03/sub/%B9%CC%Bl%B9%20%BFAC%B9%E6%20%C7%C7%
C7%D8%CO%DA%BA%B8%C8%A3%B9%FD(2004.%2010.%2030.%20%C5%EB%
B0%FA).pdf (last visited July 12, 2008).
31. See 150 CONG. REC. S4260, 4271 (2004) (statement of Sen. Leahy) ("I did
not think the proposed constitutional amendment was the best way forward. We
all agree... that every right provided by the victims' rights amendment can be, or
already is, protected by State or Federal statutory law."). See also id. at 4275
(statement of Sen. Durbin) ("I agree with James Madison, who wrote that the
United States Constitution should be amended only on 'great and extraordinary
occasions,' and I am reluctant to amend our Constitution for only the 18th time
since the adoption of the Bill of Rights.").
32. See 150 CONG. REC. 84260 (2004) (statement of Sen. Feinstein) ("Essen-
tially, bottom line, what we have found after numerous Judiciary Committee sub-
committee hearings, committee hearings, markups, putting the victims' rights
constitutional amendment out on the Senate floor in a prior session, taking it down
because we didn't have the votes, beginning anew in this session, going through
the processes in committee, and recognizing that we didn't have the 67 votes neces-
sary for a constitutional amendment-both Senator Kyl and I, as well as the vic-
tims and their advocates decided that we should compromise.").
20081 631
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Supporters of an amendment to the United States Constitution
reluctantly viewed this legislation as a practical step forward. 33
Whether it was merely the exigencies of time or a carefully
planned strategy, the CVRA was passed with very little legisla-
tive debate, input from the judiciary, and without national pub-
licity or visibility.34 With Senators Feinstein and Kyl leading
the way, the Senate passed the bill by a vote of 96 to 1 and the
House passed the bill by a vote of 393 to 14.35 The Senate ver-
sion integrated a few provisions that were more pro-victim than
the House version, such as requiring a "clear and convincing"
standard of proof that a victim's testimony would be materially
altered before a victim can be excluded from the courtroom. 36
The final compromise bill was passed in a basket of legislation,
titled the "Justice for All Act," which contained two well-publi-
cized, pro-defendant statutes authorizing funding for the use of
DNA evidence to prove innocence and training to improve de-
fense representation in capital cases.37 Despite having implica-
33. See 150 CONG. REC. S4260, 4263 (2004) (statement of Sen. Feinstein)
("[Wie will follow this bill carefully and we will see whether the enforcement rights
contained in this bill are adequate. If not, you can be sure as the sun will rise
tomorrow, we will be back with a constitutional amendment."). See also Scott
Campbell, Stephanie Roper, Wendy Preston, Louarna Gillis, Nila Lynn Crime Vic-
tims Rights Act: Hearing on HR. 4342 Before the H.R. Comm. on the Judiciary,
109th Cong. (June 21, 2006) (statement of Margaret A. Garvin, then-Director of
Programs, National Crime Victim Law Institute).
34. See United States v. Marcello, 370 F. Supp. 2d 745, 749 (N.D. Ill. 2005)
("First, little legislative history exists. Nowhere in the legislative history provided
by the Government (nor found independently) does one find the debate or exchange
of ideas that more frequently accompanies the art of law-crafting."). See also 150
CONG. REC. S4260, 4272 (2004) (statement of Sen. Leahy) (Senator Leahy, while
supporting passage of the CVRA, noted that "we had so little opportunity to work
on crafting the crime victims' statute. I would have liked to have gotten the views
of the Office for Victims of Crime and other components of the Department of Jus-
tice, for example .... [We had] no time to hold hearings on it or improve the bill in
Committee.").
35. National Organization for Victim Assistance, supra note 30, at 1; Pamela
Blume Leonard, All But Death, Can Be Adjusted, CHAMPION MAGAZINE, December
2006, at 40, available at http://www.nacdl.org/_852566CF0070A126.nsfY0/A5E2F
90FCEE059FF8525727A0078CA03?Open.
36. See Kyl et al., supra note 2, at 592-93, 599-601.
37. See Justice For All Act, Pub. L. No. 108-405, Preamble (codified as
amended in several sections of 18 U.S.C. and 42 U.S.C. (2004)) ("To protect victims'
rights, to eliminate the substantial backlog of DNA samples collected from crime
scenes and convicted offenders, to improve and expand the DNA testing capacity of
Federal, State, and local crime laboratories, to increase research and development
of new DNA testing technologies, to develop new training programs regarding the
632 [Vol. 28:623
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tions for the workload of the federal judiciary, no
representatives of the judicial branch testified or submitted
statements at the hearing. The Act was adopted on Saturday,
October 9, 2004, during the end-of-session rush to adjourn,
passing in the Senate and the House by unanimous consent
without debate or comment.38 President Bush signed the bill
into law on October 30, 2004.
Congressional sponsors of the CVRA intended that the
CVRA serve as a model for amending state constitutional and
statutory provisions, since most criminal cases are litigated in
state courts. Sen. Feinstein stated:
This act, of course, binds only the federal system, but is designed
to affect the states also. First it is hoped that states will look to
this law as a model and incorporate it into their own systems.
This law encourages that by allowing both types of grants-legal
assistance and victim notification-to be provided to state enti-
ties, and for use in state systems where the state has in place
"laws substantially equivalent" to this act. 39
Without state adoption of these recently created rights and
remedies, the CVRA would have a negligible impact on the
overall treatment of victims within the criminal system and
would likely prompt victims' rights advocates to resume their
crusade for a federal constitutional amendment. 40
The CVRA authorizes six categories of appropriations to
benefit crime victims and to facilitate the implementation of its
provisions at the federal and state levels. 41 One provision au-
collection and use of DNA evidence, to provide post-conviction testing of DNA evi-
dence to exonerate the innocent, to improve the performance of counsel in State
capital cases, and for other purposes.").
38. National Organization for Victim Assistance, supra note 30, at 1.
39. 150 CONG. REC. S4260, 4262 (2004) (statement of Sen. Feinstein).
40. See id.
41. Justice For All Act, Pub. L. No. 108-405 (codified as amended in 42 U.S.C.
§ 10603d (2004)) includes the following five categories of authorized appropria-
tions: (1) $2,000,000 for fiscal year 2005 and $5,000,000 for the fiscal years 2006-
2009 to the United States Attorneys Offices for Victim's Witnesses Assistance Pro-
grams; (2) similar amounts to the Office of Victims of Crime of the Department of
Justice for enhancement of the Victim Notification System; (3) $300,000 in fiscal
year 2005 and $500,000 for each of the fiscal years 2006-2009, to the Office for
Victims of Crime of the Department of Justice for staff to administer the appropri-
ation for the support of organizations designed under item four; (4) $7,000,000 for
fiscal years 2005 and $11,000,000 for each of the fiscal years 2006-2009, to the
Office for Victims of Crime of the Department of Justice for the support of organi-
20081 633
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thorizes $7,000,000 for fiscal year 2005 and $11,000,000 for
each of the fiscal years 2006-2009 to the Office for Victims of
Crime of the Department of Justice for enforcement of crime
victims' rights in Federal jurisdictions and to States and tribal
governments that have laws "substantially equivalent to the
provisions" of the CVRA. 42 The Department of Justice has not
issued regulations or guidelines on the meaning of the phrase
"substantially equivalent."43 Only a small portion of the funds
authorized by the CVRA have actually been appropriated."
Fully implementing the CVRA requires a significant alloca-
tion of scarce criminal justice resources. Resource needs in-
clude improving crime-victim notification systems, hiring and
training victim/witness coordinators, and funding pro bono or-
ganizations for legal counsel and support services for indigent
crime victims. Other costs include the likely increase in the fed-
eral appellate court's workload as more crime victims and their
representatives exercise their CVRA rights.
zations that provide legal counsel and support services for victims in criminal
cases for the enforcement of crime victims' rights in Federal jurisdictions, and in
States and tribal governments that have laws "substantially equivalent" to the
provisions of the CVRA; (5) $5,000,000 for fiscal year 2005 and $7,000,000 for fis-
cal years 2006-2009, to the Office for Victims of Crime of the Department of Justice
for the support of: (A) training and technical assistance to States and tribal juris-
dictions to craft state-of-the-art victims' rights laws and (B) training and technical
assistance to States and tribal jurisdictions to design a variety of compliance sys-
tems, which shall include an evaluation component. In addition, 42 U.S.C.
§ 10603e (2004) amends the Victims of Crime Act of 1984 to authorize $5,000,000
for each of the fiscal years 2005-2009 for grants to State, tribal, and local prosecu-
tors' offices, law enforcement agencies, courts, jails, and correctional institutions
and to qualified public or private entities to develop and implement state-of-the-
art systems for notifying victims of crime of important dates and developments,
provided that the jurisdiction has laws "substantially equivalent" to the CVRA.
42. Id. (emphasis added).
43. Cf U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, ATTORNEY GENERAL GUIDELINES FOR VICTIM
AND WITNESS ASSISTANCE (2005), http://www.usdoj.gov/olp/final.pdf. Margaret A.
Garvin, Executor Director, National Crime Victim Law Institute, stated: "What is
necessary for a law to be 'substantially similar' to the CVRA is that it afford a
victim the ability to independently assert and seek enforcement of his or her rights
at both the trial and appellate levels." E-mail from Margaret A. Garvin dated Sep-
tember 5, 2008 (on file with author).
44. Telephone interview with Margaret A. Garvin, then-Director of Programs,
National Crime Victim Law Institute (April 28, 2008). See also Hearing on HR.
4342, statement of Margaret A. Garvin, supra note 33.
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III. Crime Victims' Rights Act of 2004
A. Rights Provided by the CVRA
The CVRA, section 3771(a) amends the federal criminal
code to grant crime victims specified rights, including:
(1) The right to be reasonably protected from the accused.
(2) The right to reasonable, accurate, and timely notice of any
public court proceeding, or any parole proceeding, involving the
crime or of any release or escape of the accused.
(3) The right not to be excluded from any such public court pro-
ceeding, unless the court, after receiving clear and convincing evi-
dence, determines that testimony by the victim would be
materially altered if the victim heard other testimony at that
proceeding.
(4) The right to be reasonably heard at any public proceeding in
the district court involving release, plea, sentencing, or any parole
proceeding.
(5) The reasonable right to confer with the attorney for the Gov-
ernment in the case.
(6) The right to full and timely restitution as provided in law.
(7) The right to proceedings free from unreasonable delay.
(8) The right to be treated with fairness and with respect for the
victim's dignity and privacy.
45
These rights may be asserted by the crime victim or the crime
victim's lawful representative and the attorney for the Govern-
ment.46 In addition, "[tihe prosecutor shall advise the crime vic-
tim that the crime victim can seek the advice of an attorney
"47
Although the CVRA does not provide grounds for a new
trial if rights are denied, it allows victims to file motions to re-
open a plea or sentence in certain circumstances .4 8 The CVRA
also adds new victims' rights and modifies some of the existing
45. 18 U.S.C. § 3771(a) (2004).
46. Id. § 3771(d)(1).
47. Id. § 3771(c)(2).
48. Id. § 3771(d)(5) ("Limitation on Relief. In no case shall a failure to afford a
right under this chapter provide grounds for a new trial. A victim may make a
motion to re-open a plea or sentence only if: (A) the victim has asserted the right to
be heard before or during the proceeding at issue and such right was denied, (B)
the victim petitions the court of appeals for a writ of mandamus within 10 days,
and (C) in the case of a plea, the accused has not pled to the highest offense
charged."). See also The Justice for All Act, April, 2006, http://ojp.usdoj.gov/ovc/
publications/factshts/justforall/content.html.
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rights. Most notable is the new right of victims to be reasonably
heard at any public proceeding involving release, plea, or
sentencing.49
Further, the CVRA provides that crime victims have the
right to "proceedings free from unreasonable delay."50 Kyl,
Twist, and Higgins observe that "delays in criminal proceedings
are among the most chronic problems faced by victims.
Whatever peace of mind a victim might achieve after a crime is
too often inexcusably postponed by unreasonable delays in the
criminal case."51 The victim may assert this right when the de-
fendant or the Government seeks delay and the defense does
not object. Kyl, Twist, and Higgins argue that this right
"should be interpreted so that any decision to schedule,
reschedule, or continue criminal cases should include victim in-
put through the victim's assertion of the right to be free from
unreasonable delay."52
There are also concerns with this right. The victim's right
to proceedings free from unreasonable delay may conflict with
exceptions to the Speedy Trial Act,53 and, possibly, the defen-
dant's due process right to prepare a defense. Further, the gov-
49. 18 U.S.C. § 3771(a)(4).
50. Id. § 3771(a)(7).
51. Kyl et al., supra note 2, at 611.
52. Id.
53. 18 U.S.C. §§ 3161-3179 (1975). There are several exceptions in the Speedy
Trial Act that might authorize a delay that may seem unreasonable to a victim.
Courts will need to decide whether such delays are presumptively reasonable or a
violation of 18 U.S.C. § 3771(a)(7). See Henderson v. United States, 476 U.S. 321,
326-33 (1986). The U.S. ATTORNEYS CRIMINAL RESOURCE MANUAL 628, SPEEDY
TRAL ACT OF 1974 (2006), available at http://www.usdoj.gov/usao/eousa/foiaread-
ing-room/usam/title9/crmOO628.htm, states:
Certain pretrial delays are automatically excluded from the Act's time lim-
its, such as delays caused by pretrial motions. In Henderson, the Supreme
Court held that § 3161(h)(1)(F) excludes "all time between the filing of a
motion and the conclusion of the hearing on that motion, whether or not a
delay in holding that hearing is 'reasonably necessary." The Act also ex-
cludes a reasonable period (up to 30 days) during which a motion is actually
'under advisement' by the court. Other delays excluded from the Act's time
limits include delays caused by the unavailability of the defendant or an
essential witness, delays attributable to a co-defendant, and delays attribu-
table to the defendant's involvement in other proceedings, including delay
resulting from an interlocutory appeal.
Id. (citing 18 U.S.C. § 3161(h)(1)(E) (1975); 18 U.S.C. § 3161(h)(1)(F); 18 U.S.C.
§ 3161 (h)(1)(J); Henderson, 476 U.S. at 330) (citations omitted).
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ernment needs time to prepare and organize its case, limiting
the speed with which a trial may commence.
B. Scope of the CVRA
1. What crimes qualify?
Under the CVRA, victims' rights are applicable to any Fed-
eral offense or an offense committed in the District of Columbia,
Federal territories, or Indian Reservations. 54 Therefore, victims
may assert their rights both in felony and misdemeanor cases
involving both violent and non-violent crimes. 55 During the ne-
gotiations for a federal constitutional amendment, victims'
rights advocates agreed on a definition of victim as a "victim of
violent crime," which is far more limited in scope than the
CVRA's definition. 56
Similarly, the definition of "victim" in many state constitu-
tions and statutes is more limited than that in the CVRA. In
some states, an eligible victim is limited to a person who has
suffered actual or threatened physical, psychological, or finan-
cial injury as the result of a crime. For example, Florida, Mary-
land, and South Carolina all recognize victim status based on a
showing of direct injury. 57 Similarly, Illinois restricts victim
status to victims suffering actual injuries as a result of violent
54. See 18 U.S.C. § 3771(e).
55. Id. See also 150 CONG. REC. S4260, 4275-76 (2004) (statement of Sen.
Kennedy) ("This legislation will protect all victims of crime, including victims of
identity theft, personal property theft, fraud, embezzlement, vandalism, and other
non-violent offenses.").
56. See National Victims Constitutional Amendment Passage, supra note 1.
The proposed victims' rights amendment defined victim as follows: "The rights of
victims of violent crime, being capable of protection without denying the constitu-
tional rights of those accused of victimizing them are hereby established and shall
not be denied by any State or the United States and may be restricted only as
provided in this article." Id. (emphasis added).
57. See FLA. STAT. § 960.03(13) (1985) ("'Victim' means: (a) A person who suf-
fers personal physical injury or death as a direct result of a crime; ... (c) A person
against whom a forcible felony was committed and who suffers a psychiatric or
psychological injury as a direct result of that crime but who does not otherwise
sustain a personal physical injury of death."); MD. CODE ANN., CRIM. PROC. § 11-
104(2) (West 2004) ("'victim' means a person who suffers actual or threatened
physical, emotional, or financial harm as a direct result of a crime or delinquent
act."); S.C. CODE ANN. § 16-3-1510 (1984) ("'Victim' means any individual who suf-
fers direct or threatened physical, psychological, or financial harm as the result of
the commission or attempted commission of a criminal offense.").
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crime. 58 Other states are even more limited, focusing not on ac-
tual injury, but on the nature of the crime committed. For ex-
ample, Louisiana limits the definition of victim to those victims
of felonies, sexual offenses, and domestic violence. 59 The adop-
tion of the CVRA by the states would result in greatly expanded
eligibility for "victim" status.
Victims' rights advocates argue that serious harm may be
inflicted on victims of non-violent felonies and misdemeanors,
including identify theft, personal property theft, fraud, embez-
zlement, serious vandalism, and other non-violent offenses. On
the other hand, non-violent misdemeanors also include large
numbers of cases of minor conflicts among neighbors and
others, including dog-at-large, noise disturbances, minor acts of
trespass, and drunk and disorderly persons.
States considering adoption of the CVRA's broad definition
of "victim" face a different environment than prosecution of
crime at the federal level.60 Millions of misdemeanor cases are
processed nationwide by the states. States will need to consider
how best to allocate their scarce criminal justice resources and
take into consideration the administrative demands, unfunded
financial costs, and the likelihood of increased appellate litiga-
tion. In addition, states will also need to consider the serious
harm inflicted on victims by non-violent misdemeanor crimes,
the benefits of recognizing their rights, and avoiding creating
two classes of crime victims.
58. 725 ILL. COMP. STAT. 120/3(a) (1993) ("'Crime victim' means (1) a person
physically injured... as a result of a violent crime... or (2) a person who suffers
injury to or loss of property as a result of a violent crime perpetrated or
attempted.").
59. LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 46:1842(9) (1985) ("'ictim' means a person against
whom any of the following offenses have been committed: (a) Any homicide, or any
felony offense .... (b) Any sexual offense. (c) The offenses of vehicular negligent
injuring and first degree vehicular negligent injuring. (d) Any offense... commit-
ted against a family or household member ... or dating partner. .. ").
60. However, the CVRA applies to offenses committed in the District of Co-
lumbia. 18 U.S.C. §3771(e) (2004). Since the District of Columbia processes a
large number of misdemeanor cases similar to that of other states, a study of the
degree to which the CVRA is being implemented and the problems encountered in
the District of Columbia might be of assistance to other states considering the
adoption of the CVRA's broad definition of crime victims. Also, it might be of assis-
tance to the Department of Justice's Office of Victims of Crime in formulating pol-
icy, making grants, and planning program initiatives.
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2. Who can claim status as a "victim" of a federal
offense under the CVRA, assert its rights, and
seek to obtain its benefits?
Eligibility to claim victim status under the CVRA estab-
lishes not only trial participation rights, such as the right to be
reasonably heard at sentencing, but other rights as well, such
as the right to full and timely restitution.61
The CVRA broadly defines "crime victim":
[T]he term crime victim means a person directly and proximately
harmed as a result of the commission of a Federal offense or an
offense in the District of Columbia. In the case of a crime victim
who is under 18 years of age, incompetent, incapacitated, or de-
ceased, the legal guardians of the crime victim or the representa-
tive of the crime victim's estate, family members, or any other
persons appointed as suitable by the court, may assume crime vic-
tim's rights under this chapter, but in no event shall the defen-
dant be named as such guardian or representative. 62
In addition, the CVRA provides that a person accused of an of-
fense is not a "victim" and may not assert any of its rights. 6
3
This definition, requiring only that persons be "directly and
proximately harmed," conflicts with and is broader than the def-
inition of "victim" in Rule 32(a)(2) of the Federal Rules of Crimi-
nal Procedure. Under Rule 32(a)(2), a victim is defined as "an
individual against whom the defendant committed an offense
for which the court will impose sentence."64 As a result of this
conflict, the Judicial Conference of the United States recom-
mended that the U.S. Supreme Court propose amendments to
Rules 1 and 32 of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure to
conform to the CVRA's definition of "crime victim." 65 On April
23, 2008, the U.S. Supreme Court submitted to Congress crime
victims' rights amendments to the Federal Rules of Criminal
61. 18 U.S.C. §3771(a)(6) (2004). See, e.g., In re Antrobus, 519 F.3d 1123
(10th Cir. 2008).
62. 18 U.S.C. § 3771(e) (emphasis added).
63. Id. § 3771(d)(1) ("A person accused of the crime may not obtain any form of
relief under this chapter.").
64. FED. R. CRIM. P. 32(a)(2).
65. See JUDICIAL CONFERENCE COMMITTEE ON RULES OF PRACTICE AND PROCE-
DURE, MEETING OF JUNE 11-12, 2007 24-29, http://www.uscourts.gov/rules/Minutes/
ST06-2007-min.pdf (approving the amendments of Rules 1, 12.1, 17, 18, 32, 60,
and 61 for final approval by the Judicial Conference).
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Procedure, effective December 1, 2008. The proposed Rule
1(b)(11) states: "'victim' means a 'crime victim' as defined in 18
U.S.C. § 3771(e)."66
Senator Jon Kyl, a sponsor of the CVRA, stated that the
definition of "victim" was intentionally broad "because all vic-
tims of crime deserve to have their rights protected, whether or
not they are the victim of the count charged."67 Thus, the CVRA
applies to situations in which no prosecution is underway. 68
To illustrate the confusion this application may yield, sup-
pose that a person is charged with five criminal separate but
related offenses in a five-count indictment, each with different
victims. A plea agreement to one count of the indictment is
reached and accepted and the other four counts are dismissed.
May persons who are allegedly harmed by the crimes in the four
counts that were dismissed and remain unproven assert rights
under the CVRA? Should persons who are "victims of related
but uncharged, dismissed, or acquitted criminal conduct" be
recognized as "victims" under the CVRA?69
Use of the phrase "a person directly and proximately
harmed" is intended to have a broad application. Referring to
this phrase, Kyl, Twist, and Higgins state: "These terms neces-
sarily invoke the concept of 'foreseeability,' which has been lib-
erally interpreted in other victims' statutes. Simply put, crime
foreseeability has far-reaching consequences."70
Applying a "foreseeability" standard or another similar cau-
sation test will no doubt result in differences of interpretation
and, not surprisingly, litigation. For example, in a recent case
the defendant pled guilty to conspiracy to possess marijuana
66. 66. Amendments to the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure, April 23,
2008, available at http://www.supremecourtus.gov/orders/courtorders/frcr08p.pdf.
67. See 150 CONG. REC. S4260, 4270 (2004) (statement of Sen. Kyl) ("This is
an intentionally broad definition because all victims of crime deserve to have their
rights protected, whether or not they are the victim of the count charged.").
68. See 18 U.S.C. § 3771(d)(3) ('The rights described.. . shall be asserted in
the district court in which a defendant is being prosecuted for the crime or if no
prosecution is underway, in the district court in the district in which the crime
occurred.").
69. Jefri Wood, The Crime Victims' Rights Act of 2004 and the Federal Courts,
FEDERAL JUDICIAL CENTER, June 2, 2008, at 8, http://www.jc.gov/public/pdf.nsff
lookup/cvra0806.pdf/$file/cvra0806.pdf.
70. See Kyl et al., supra note 2, at 594.
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with intent to distribute. 71 The former girlfriend of one of the
defendant's customers claimed that her former boyfriend
abused her at least in part because of his use of the marijuana
sold by the defendant and was, therefore, a "victim" under the
CVRA and should have the right to give a victim impact state-
ment at the defendant's sentencing hearing. After an extensive
discussion of the meaning of "directly and proximately" harmed,
the District Court rejected her claim, holding that linking the
defendant's criminal act to the alleged abuse was too attenu-
ated, either temporally or factually, to demonstrate the re-
quired nexus between the defendant's act of selling drugs and
her former boyfriend's subsequent act of abusing her.
72
In relation to the above case, suppose the accused is on trial
for possession of illegal narcotics with intent to sell or dis-
tribute. One of the alleged victims is a customer of the defen-
dant whose addiction resulted from purchasing drugs from the
defendant for more than two years. If the customer is given im-
munity against prosecution and agrees to testify against the al-
leged seller, is the customer a "victim"? In relation to the
defendant's alleged customer, who else might qualify as a "a
person directly and proximately harmed" and thus be entitled
to victim status: (1) the customer's spouse? (2) minor or adult
children? (3) parents? (4) other relatives? (5) another person in
a serious relationship with the customer? (6) the customer's em-
ployer? What showing is required for each of these persons to
intervene to request recognition as a "victim"? 73
Moreover, do companies or other organizations have rights
under the CVRA? The definition of crime victim refers only to
"a person directly and proximately harmed . . . ,,74 "A related
statute, 42 U.S.C. §10607(e), includes 'an institutional entity' in
its definition of victim." 75 Also, the legal rights of a crime victim
71. United States v. Sharp, 463 F. Supp. 2d 556, 558 (E.D. Va. 2006).
72. Id. at 561-67.
73. Cf United States v. Guevara-Toloso, No. 04-1455, 2005 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
9762 (E.D.N.Y. May 23, 2005). The court held that proximate harm does not in-
clude victims of former state crimes involving the same defendant. However, the
court also noted that the CVRA may be ambiguous regarding previous federal
crimes, because it is not clear at what point a victim's right is extinguished post-
conviction. Id. at *2-6.
74. 18 U.S.C. § 3771(e) (emphasis added).
75. Wood, supra note 69, at 10.
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may be asserted by the legal representatives and guardians of
crime victims under age eighteen and of persons who are "in-
competent, incapacitated, or deceased."76
The definition of "victim" in many state constitutions and
statutes is more limited. For example, in Arizona, a crime vic-
tim is defined as "a person against whom the criminal offense
has been committed or, if the person is killed or incapacitated,
the person's spouse, parent, child or other lawful representative
.... If the person is in custody for an offense or is the ac-
cused, victim status is denied.78
By specifying the necessary relationship to a deceased vic-
tim, Arizona and other states provide a clearer, but narrower,
definition than the "proximately harmed" language of the
CVRA. The more restricted definitions of victims in most
states' victims' rights provisions reduce the likelihood of large
numbers of persons asserting rights as "victims," except in
those situations where a large scale crime occurs, such as the
Oklahoma City bombing or an Enron-type debacle.
76. 18 U.S.C. § 3771(e).
77. ARiz. CONST. art. II, § 2.1.
78. Id. Colorado and Florida also limit the definition of crime victim in their
constitutions by permitting "immediate family" or "next of kin" to assert victims'
rights if the primary victim is deceased. See COL. CONST. art. II, § 16(a) ("Any
person who is a victim of a criminal act, or such person's designee, legal guardian,
or surviving immediate family members if such person is deceased, shall have the
right to be heard when relevant, informed, and present at all critical stages of the
criminal justice process. All terminology, including the term 'critical stages', shall
be defined by the General Assembly."); FLA. CONST. art. I, § 16(b) ("Victims of
crime or their lawful representatives, including the next of kin of homicide victims,
are entitled to the right to be informed, to be present, and to be heard when rele-
vant, at all crucial stages of criminal proceedings, to the extent that these rights do
not interfere with the constitutional rights of the accused."). Some state constitu-
tions define victim based on definitions found in statutes. In Connecticut, in order
for someone to assume the rights of a deceased victim, the deceased is required to
formally designate that person beforehand. See CONN. GEN. STAT. § 54-126a (2004)
("For the purposes of this section, 'victim' means a person who is a victim of a
crime, the legal representative of such person, a member of a deceased victim's
immediate family or a person designated by a deceased victim in accordance with
section 1-56r."); CONN. GEN. STAT. § 1-56r (2001) ("Any person eighteen years of
age or older may execute a document that designates another person eighteen
years of age or older to make certain decisions on behalf of the maker of such docu-
ment and have certain rights and obligations with respect to the maker of such
document.").
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3. What happens when there are multiple crime victims?
The CVRA includes a provision addressing multiple crime
victims, providing the courts with discretion to determine a rea-
sonable method of affording crime victims their rights without
unduly delaying the proceedings:
In a case where the court finds that the number of crime victims
makes it impractical to accord all of the crime victims the rights
described in subsection (a), the court shall fashion a reasonable
procedure to give effect to this chapter that does not unduly com-
plicate or prolong the proceedings. 79
Some recent cases addressing the "right to be heard" provi-
sion of the CVRA reveal judicial concern over the practical is-
sues that may arise when numerous victims assert their rights.
Judge Friedman's concurrence in Kenna v. United States illus-
trates the point:
Although only Kenna filed a petition for mandamus, the "Conclu-
sion" of the opinion gives not only Kenna but the "other victims" of
the fraud the right to speak at Zvi's sentencing. Suppose a case
with five defendants and 20 victims. Does each victim have the
right to speak at the sentencing of each defendant? Although the
court notes that "Kenna concedes that the district court may place
reasonable constraints on the duration and content of victims'
speech, such as avoiding undue delay, repetition or the use of pro-
fanity," it is difficult to believe that the Act requires the court to
listen to 100 victim statements.80
Other judges, however, have concluded that the possibility of
multiple crime victims will not overburden the courts, and the
legislative safeguards for such situations provide sufficient dis-
cretion for the court to fashion a reasonable alternative
procedure.8'
79. 18 U.S.C. § 3771(d)(2).
80. Kenna v. United States, 435 F.3d 1011, 1019 (9th Cir. 2006) (Friedman,
J., concurring).
81. See United States v. Degenhardt, 405 F. Supp. 2d 1341, 1350 (D. Utah
2006) ("[Ilt might be argued that courts must have discretion on whether to hear
from victims because some cases (particularly financial fraud cases) may involve
hundreds or thousands of victims. If a court is required to hear from all these
victims, the argument runs, then courts will be overwhelmed. This hypothesis,
however, is not borne out by the actual experience in the many state courts that
give victims a right to speak at sentencing. Many states give victims of financial
crimes a right to be heard at sentencing. The reports from these states indicate
20081 643
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Although the Attorney General Guidelines apply only to ex-
ecutive branch officers, it is likely that judges would employ the
guidelines' suggestions to provide large numbers of victims
their rights. For instance, the guidelines suggest using the Au-
tomated Victim Notification System, official websites, print me-
dia, and toll free numbers to identify and notify large groups of
victims.8 2 Concerning participation, the guidelines suggest that
victims use e-mail to communicate victim impact statements
and video feeds to view the proceedings when attendance is im-
practicable.8 3 The rights afforded victims under the statute,
however, require repeated notification and accommodation by
the court for victims to attend various pretrial, trial, and post-
trial proceedings, especially if rescheduling is necessary to ac-
commodate the needs of the judge, prosecutor, or defense attor-
ney.8 4 Thus, even utilizing the latest technology, delays in the
criminal proceedings would likely result if large numbers of vic-
tims desired to exercise their participatory rights.8 5
4. The Nature of Rights Afforded: Mandatory or
Discretionary?
Mandatory rights have been described as "rights the state
is without discretion to disregard."8 6 Discretionary rights may
range from those conferring broad and largely unbounded dis-
cretion to those with narrow discretion limited by ascertainable
legal standards. Victims' rights statutes with broad, unfettered
discretion or without meaningful remedies may confer largely
illusory or advisory rights. A court's interpretation of victims'
that proceedings there have not been significantly prolonged .... And finally, if
there were ever a case with many victims that truly threatened to interfere with a
court's ability to function, the CVRA itself solves the problem. In cases involving
an overwhelming number of victims, the CVRA allows courts to fashion a reasona-
ble alternative procedure.") (footnotes omitted).
82. See U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, supra note 43, at 13-14. See, e.g., United
States v. Croteau, No. 05-CR-30104, 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 23684, at *3 (S.D. Ill.
April 27, 2006) (unpublished) (granting the Government permission to publish de-
tails about a change of plea hearing on a public website in a multiple victim case,
and finding that the court's obligation under the CVRA to ensure that victims are
afforded their rights outweighed possible disclosure concerns).
83. See U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, supra note 43, at 63-64.
84. See 18 U.S.C. § 3771(a).
85. See Kenna, 435 F.3d at 1018-19.
86. Beloof, The Third Wave, supra note 8, at 278.
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rights constitutional amendments and statutes may largely de-
termine the ultimate nature of the rights provided. For exam-
ple, the Kansas Supreme Court found that victims' rights were
discretionary regardless of mandatory language, but en-
couraged judges to afford victims their rights when "the court
deems it advisable and when it can be accomplished without un-
due burden on the judicial system."87
Five of the eight enumerated rights in the CVRA-num-
bers 1, 2, 4, 5, and 7-are qualified by use of the word "reasona-
ble" or "reasonably." These five rights are to: (1) "be reasonably
protected from the accused"; (2) "reasonable, accurate, and
timely notice of any public court proceeding, or parole proceed-
ing, involving the crime, or any release or escape of the ac-
cused"; (4) "be reasonably heard at any public proceeding in the
district court involving release, plea, sentencing, or any parole
proceeding"; (5) "confer with the attorney for the Government in
the case"; and (7) "proceedings free from unreasonable delay."88
The three rights not so qualified-numbers 3, 6, and 8-are to:
(3) "not be excluded from any such public court proceeding, un-
less the court, after receiving clear and convincing evidence, de-
termines that testimony by the victim would be materially
altered if the victim heard other testimony at that proceeding";
(6) "full and timely restitution as provided in law"; and (8) "be
treated with fairness and with respect for the victim's dignity
and privacy."8 9
Thus, police officers, prosecutors, and judges have some
discretionary authority, but the discretion is limited by a vague
but arguably ascertainable legal standard in applying five of
the eight rights. An additional qualification specifically applies
to the prosecutor and to police officers and victims' rights coor-
dinators to the extent that they are under the prosecutor's di-
rection: "Nothing in this chapter shall be construed to impair
the prosecutorial discretion of the Attorney General or any
other officer under his direction."90 Another qualification is
that the CVRA only requires that federal law enforcement offi-
cials engaged in the detection, investigation, or prosecution of
87. State v. Holt, 874 P.2d 1183, 1188 (Kan. 1994).
88. 18 U.S.C. § 3771(a).
89. Id.
90. 18 U.S.C. § 3771(d)(6).
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crime shall make their "best efforts to see that crime victims are
notified of, and accorded, the rights described . "... 91 The
phrase, "best efforts," is a vague standard echoing language in
Section 502 of the Victims' Rights and Restitution Act of 1990.92
However, the CVRA imposes a duty upon the trial judge to en-
sure that the CVRA's rights are meaningfully applied, stating:
"In any court proceeding involving an offense against a crime
victim, the court shall ensure that the crime victim is afforded
the rights described . . .,93
IV. Victims' Rights at Different Stages of the
Criminal Process
The rights provided by the CVRA vary according to the na-
ture of the right and the stage of the proceeding. The rights to
reasonable notice and not to be excluded are expansive, apply-
ing to "any public court proceeding, or any parole proceeding,
involving the crime or of any release or escape of the accused."94
The right to be reasonably heard, however, only applies at pub-
lic proceedings involving release, plea, sentencing, or parole and
not at the actual trial. The other five rights afforded to victims
under the Act make no mention of the different stages of crimi-
nal proceedings. 95 In determining what is "reasonable" in rela-
tion to five of the eight crime victims' rights set forth in the
CVRA, courts are likely to take into consideration the different
stages of the criminal process in balancing the needs and inter-
ests of the prosecutors, defendants, and crime victims. Defend-
91. Id. § 3771(c) (emphasis added).
92. Cf 42 U.S.C. §10606(a) (1990). The statute provides language describing
the only remedy available in the Victims' Rights and Restitution Act of 1990: offi-
cials "shall make their best efforts to see that victims of crime are accorded the
rights described" in the Act. Id. (emphasis added). This remedy has been super-
seded by the remedies provided by the CRVA. See supra notes 14-15.
93. 18 U.S.C. § 3771(b).
94. Id. § 3771(a).
95. See Paul G. Cassell, Recognizing Victims in the Federal Rules of Criminal
Procedure: Proposed Amendments in Light of the Crime Victims' Rights Act, 2005
BYU L. REV. 835, 855 (2005) [hereinafter Cassell, Recognizing Victims] (arguing
that the legislative history of the CVRA indicates Congress intended it as a reme-
dial statute, and therefore any general provision should be interpreted "generously
so as to effectuate the important congressional goals."); Paul G. Cassell, Treating
Crime Victims Fairly: Integrating Victims into the Federal Rules of Criminal Proce-
dure, 2007 UTAH L. REV. 861 (2007) [hereinafter Cassell, Treating Crime Victims
Fairly].
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ants' interest in pretrial and trial proceedings are greater than
in post-trial proceedings. The presumption of innocence and the
right to prepare a defense are protected by the due process
clause prior to adjudication of guilt. At sentencing and post-
trial proceedings, such as parole hearings, defendants have a
diminished liberty interest.
A. Pretrial Rights: Right to be Reasonably Protected from the
Accused and to be Present and Reasonably Heard at
Pretrial Release Hearings
The crime victim's right to notice of, to be present at, and to
be heard at the pretrial release hearing or the defendant's ini-
tial appearance 96 potentially juxtaposes a crime victim's rights
against a jailed suspect's liberty interest in a prompt judicial
determination of pretrial release. The first right of crime vic-
tims set forth in the CVRA is "[t]he right to be reasonably pro-
tected from the accused."97 A crime victim may have relevant
information to provide the judge, for example, facts unknown to
the prosecutor that relate to the future dangerousness of the
defendant.
There is a potential conflict between the defendant's statu-
tory rights under Rule 5(a) and the victim's rights under the
CVRA, section 3771(a)(2). Under Rule 5(a) of the Federal Rules
of Criminal Procedure, 98 a person making an arrest within the
United States must take the defendant without unnecessary de-
lay before a judicial officer. Is it "necessary" within the mean-
ing of Rule 5(a) to delay the defendant's initial appearance to
ensure that crime victims receive reasonable, accurate, and
timely notice of this proceeding? Also, section 3771(a)(2) of the
CVRA only requires "reasonable" notice.99 Is it reasonable for
the judge to delay the initial appearance if the accused is in jail
in order to allow time for all alleged victims to be notified?
There may be little time to notify alleged crime victims and
inquire whether they wish to be present and heard. The judge's
duty to insure that the crime victim's rights are protected may
impose an obligation to ask the prosecutor if victims of the al-
96. See 18 U.S.C. § 3771(a)(2)-(4).
97. Id. § 3771(a)(1).
98. FED. R. CRIM. P. 5(a).
99. See 18 U.S.C. § 3771(a)(2).
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leged offenses have been properly informed of their right to be
present and heard at a pretrial release hearing. In addition,
initial appearances may be conducted by video teleconferencing,
with the defendants' consent. 00 Procedures need to be devel-
oped to clarify how to provide accurate and timely notice of the
initial appearance to crime victims, including who should notify
them, which persons should be notified, whether these persons
desire to be present and heard, and where they should go.' 0 '
In United States v. Turner, the judge discovered, at the de-
fendant's bail hearing, that the victims in the case had not re-
ceived adequate notice of either the initial hearing or the bail
hearing. The judge, sua sponte, ordered the prosecutor to pro-
vide all alleged victims with a written summary of the proceed-
ings to that point and notification of their rights under the
CVRA to attend and be heard at future proceedings. 0 2 The
judge determined, however, that under the Bail Reform Act, no
conditions of release would reasonably assure the defendant's
appearance and entered an order of detention pending trial,
with defendant's consent, subject to reconsideration. 0 3 In a
carefully crafted opinion Judge Orenstein observed that the de-
fendant is entitled to a presumption of innocence and suggested
that an accused should not be subjected to further incarceration
without a substantive ruling on whether conditions of release
exist that satisfy the requirements of the Bail Reform Act.10 4
100. FED. R. CRIM. P. 5().
101. See United States v. Turner, 367 F. Supp. 2d 319, 323-38 (E.D.N.Y.
2005), for a thorough discussion by Judge Orenstein of the problems and some
possible solutions to provide alleged crime victims with reasonable, accurate, and
timely notice of their right to attend the initial appearance.
102. Id. at 324.
103. Id. at 321 (citing 18 U.S.C. § 3142 (e) (1984)).
104. In 1984 Congress enacted the Bail Reform Act, 18 U.S.C. §§ 3141-50. 18
U.S.C. § 3142(f) provides for preventive detention for persons charged with a crime
of violence or other specified offenses. See United States v. Salerno, 481 U.S. 739,
750 (1987) ("The Bail Reform Act . . .narrowly focuses on a particularly acute
problem in which the Government interests are overwhelming. The Act operates
only on individuals who have been arrested for a specific category of extremely
serious offenses. Congress specifically found that these individuals are far more
likely to be responsible for dangerous acts in the community after arrest .... In a
full blown adversary hearing, the Government must convince a neutral decision
maker by clear and convincing evidence that no conditions of release can reasona-
bly assure the safety of the community or any person. While the Government's
general interest in preventing crime is compelling, even this interest is heightened
when the Government musters convincing proof that the arrestee, already indicted
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Other courts have interpreted the right to be present incon-
sistently. In United States v. Marcello, the court held that the
victim's right to be heard at a pretrial release hearing could be
accommodated through written statements, and the victim was
not entitled to appear in person before the court.10 5 On the
other hand, in United States v. Degenhardt, the court held that
a crime victim's right to "be reasonably heard" at sentencing
gives the victim the right to speak directly to the judge at
sentencing. 106
B. Rights during Trial Proceedings: Right not to be
Excluded, Emotional Displays, and Victims' Seating
1. Right not to be excluded from the courtroom
Suppose there is a case involving several eyewitness vic-
tims, and the defendant is concerned that the testimony of some
victim-witnesses will be influenced by their presence in the
courtroom during the testimony of other victim-witnesses.
Should each of these witnesses have the right to be present in
the courtroom during the testimony of the other witnesses? 0 7
More generally, what should the legal standard be when the
victim is scheduled to testify and his or her testimony would be
susceptible to alteration if he or she observed the proceedings?
or held to answer for a serious crime, presents a demonstrable danger to the com-
munity. Under these narrow circumstances, society's interest in crime prevention
is at its greatest .... On the other side of the scale, of course, is the individual's
strong interest in liberty. We do not minimize the importance and fundamental
nature of this right. But ... this right may, in circumstances where the govern-
ment's interest is sufficiently weighty, be subordinated to the greater needs of
society.").
105. United States v. Marcello, 370 F. Supp. 2d 745, 746-50 (N.D. Ill. 2005).
Cf United States v. Blumhagen, No. 03-CR-56S, 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 15380, at
*4-5 (W.D.N.Y. 2006) (ordering government to provide notice allowing a reasonable
time for victims to attend a hearing for dismissal of the indictment).
106. United States v. Degenhardt, 405 F. Supp. 2d 1341, 1345 (D. Utah 2005).
See also Kenna v. United States Dist. Court (In re Kenna), 435 F.3d 1011, 1016
(9th Cir. 2006) ("The statements of the sponsors of the CVRA and the committee
report for the proposed constitutional amendment disclose a clear congressional
intent to give crime victims the right to speak at proceedings covered by the CVRA.
Our interpretation advances the purposes of the CVRA. The statute was enacted
to make crime victims full participants in the criminal justice system. Prosecutors
and defendants already have the right to speak at sentencing. ... ").
107. See Robert P. Mosteller, Victims' Rights and the United States Constitu-
tion: An Effort to Recast the Battle in Criminal Litigation, 85 GEo. L.J. 1691, 1699
(1997).
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The CVRA states that a crime victim has "the right not to
be excluded from any ... public court proceedings, unless the
court, after receiving clear and convincing evidence, determines
that testimony by the victim would be materially altered if the
victim heard other testimony at that proceeding."108
The above provision effectively amends Rule 615 of the Fed-
eral Rules of Evidence to allow victims to attend trial proceed-
ings prior to their testimony when they are serving as
witnesses, unless the stringent standard of proof set forth above
is met by the defendant. 109 In the Ninth Circuit, the trial judge
must find by clear and convincing evidence that it is highly
likely, and not merely possible, that the victim's testimony
would be materially altered if allowed to observe the proceed-
ings prior to testifying. 110 The provision also applies to the right
to attend other public court proceedings, such as pretrial re-
lease hearings and preliminary hearings to determine probable
cause.
Recent amendments to the Federal Rules of Criminal Pro-
cedure to implement the CVRA, effective December 1, 2008, in-
clude a new Rule 60(a)2, "Attending the Proceeding," which
states:
The court must not exclude a victim from a public court proceed-
ing involving the crime, unless the court determines by clear and
convincing evidence that the victim's testimony would be materi-
ally altered if the victim heard other testimony at that proceed-
ing. In determining whether to exclude a victim, the court must
make every effort to permit the fullest attendance possible by the
victim and must consider reasonable alternatives to exclusion.
The reasons for any exclusion must be clearly stated on the
record."'
The presence of a victim during a criminal trial prior to the
victim testifying has not been held to be a violation of the Fifth
108. 18 U.S.C. § 3771(a)(3) (2004) (emphasis added).
109. See In re Mikhel, 453 F.3d 1137, 1139-40 (9th Cir. 2006) (ordering trial
court to make specific findings of whether there was "clear and convincing evi-
dence" of material alteration of the victim's prospective testimony to support exclu-
sion of victim from trial).
110. Id.
111. Amendments to the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure, April 23, 2008,
available at http://www.supremecourtus.gov/orders/courtorders/frcr08p.pdf.
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Amendment right to due process. 112 However, as the Utah
Court of Appeals noted in State v. Beltran-Felix,13 victim at-
tendance may violate the Fifth Amendment, as applied, in cases
where the defendant manages to successfully prove both that
the victim's attendance allowed the victim to conform his or her
testimony, and that the tainted testimony affected the outcome
of the trial." 4
Traditionally, courts considered it presumptively prejudi-
cial to the defendant if a witness were permitted to remain in
the courtroom prior to testifying after a formal removal request.
State victims' rights constitutional amendments, legislation,
and witness sequestration rules have altered that
presumption. 1 5
The CVRA requires a showing of "clear and convincing evi-
dence" that the victim's testimony will be materially altered
and places this burden on the defendant. 1 6 The Act imposes a
higher burden of proof than most state constitutions and stat-
utes require in order to exclude a victim-witness from the court-
room." 7 In Delaware, Nevada, and Wyoming, the victim is
permitted to attend trial unless "good cause" can be shown to
exclude the victim." 8 The Nevada statute exempts victims from
112. See Douglas E. Beloof & Paul G. Cassell, The Crime Victim's Right to
Attend the Trial: The Reascendant National Consensus, 9 LEWIS & CLARK L. REV.
481, 527-34 (2005) (discussing the broad rejection of any constitutional right to
victim exclusion). See also State v. Beltran-Felix, 922 P.2d 30, 33-34 (Utah Ct.
App. 1996) (quoting various federal and state cases in which it was determined
that permitting a witness to remain in the courtroom was not a facial violation of a
defendant's Fifth Amendment Rights). Thus, victims' rights legislation that per-
mits victim attendance during all public proceedings appears to be inferentially
constitutional. See id. at 33.
113. 922 P.2d 30 (Utah Ct. App. 1996).
114. Id. at 33-35.
115. See State v. Fulimante, 975 P.2d 75, 92 (Ariz. 1999); see also Beloof &
Cassell, supra note 112, at 524-27.
116. See BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 256 (8th ed. 2004) (defining clear and con-
vincing evidence as "[elvidence indicating that the thing to be proved is highly
probable or reasonably certain. This is a greater burden than preponderance of
the evidence, the standard applied in most civil trials, but less than evidence be-
yond a reasonable doubt, the norm for criminal trials.").
117. See United States v. Johnson, 362 F. Supp. 2d 1043, 1055-56 (N.D. Iowa
2005).
118. See DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 11 § 9407 (1993) ("A victim or an individual des-
ignated by the victim may be present whenever a defendant has a right to be pre-
sent during a court proceeding concerning the crime charged other than a grand
jury proceeding, unless good cause can be shown by the defendant to exclude the
29
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exclusion based on "good cause" only if victims have completed
both direct and cross-examination testimony. 119 Other states
such as Arkansas, North Carolina, Virginia, and Wisconsin
qualify the victim's right to attend public proceedings based on
possible interference with the operation of a fair trial.120 The
California statute provides several situations-the defendant's
right to a fair trial among them-in which it is appropriate to
exclude the victim from the proceedings.' 2'
The CVRA's focus is to preserve and strengthen the victim's
right to attend trials, as opposed to emphasizing the policies un-
derlying a defendant's right to a fair trial. 122 Some prosecutors
prefer, when the order of witnesses permits, to have the victim
victim."); NEV. REV. STAT. § 171.204 (1997) ("[Tlhe magistrate may, if good cause is
shown and upon the request of any party or on his own motion, exclude from the
examination every person except: ... [t]he victim, after he has testified as a prose-
cuting witness and his cross-examination has been completed."); WYo. STAT. ANN.
§ 1-40-206 (1991) ("Unless the court for good cause shown shall find to the con-
trary, the victim, the victim's designee or both shall have the right to be present at
all trial proceedings which may be attended by the defendant.").
119. NEV. REV. STAT. § 171.204.
120. See ARK. CODE. ANN. § 16-90-1103 (1997) ("The victim or a representative
of the victim may be present whenever the defendant has a right to be present
during a court proceeding concerning the crime charged, other than a grand jury
proceeding, unless the court determines that exclusion of the victim or the victim's
representative is necessary to protect the defendant's right to a fair trial or the
confidentiality or fairness of a juvenile proceeding."); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 15A-832
(1998) ("When the victim is to be called as a witness in a court proceeding, the
court shall make every effort to permit the fullest attendance possible by the vic-
tim in the proceedings. This subsection shall not be construed to interfere with the
defendant's right to a fair trial."); VA. CODE. ANN. § 19.2-265.01 (1995) ("[Any vic-
tim... may remain in the courtroom and shall not be excluded unless the court
determines, in its discretion, the presence of the victim would impair the conduct
of a fair trial."); Wis. STAT. § 906.15 (1997) ("[U]nless the judge or circuit court
commissioner finds that exclusion of the victim is necessary to provide a fair trial
for the defendant or a fair fact-finding hearing for the juvenile.").
121. See CAL. PENAL CODE § 1102.6 (1995) ("A victim may be excluded from a
criminal proceeding only if each of the following criteria are met: [a]ny movant,
including the defendant, who seeks to exclude the victim from any criminal pro-
ceeding demonstrates that there is a substantial probability that overriding inter-
ests will be prejudiced by the presence of the victim. 'Overriding interests' may
include, but are not limited to, the following: . . .[tihe defendant's right to a fair
trial ....").
122. See, e.g., United States v. Grace, 408 F. Supp. 2d 998, 1020, 1021 (D.
Mont. 2006) (denying defendant's motions for a change of venue based on prejudi-
cial pretrial publicity, noting that the CVRA required courts to make "every effort"
to afford victims' full attendance, and this requirement was integrated into the
consideration of the interest of the community as a whole in a local trial).
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testify first or early in the trial to minimize the possibility of
altered testimony. This also prevents defense counsel from im-
peaching the victim on cross-examination by attempting to
show that the victim's testimony may have been influenced by
observing other witnesses. Another remedy might be to require
formal pretrial statements or depositions designed to freeze vic-
tim testimony before the trial begins.
2. Emotional displays in the courtroom
The CVRA does not provide guidance when a victim's be-
havior in the courtroom involves overt displays of emotion, un-
less such emotional displays are somehow connected to the
material alteration of the victim's testimony. 123 It may be ar-
gued, however, that courts have the inherent power to exclude
disruptive victims. 124 Because courts have exercised their
power to exclude disruptive defendants, although defendants
have a constitutional right under the Confrontation and Due
Process Clauses to be present during court proceedings, they
may have the same power to exclude disruptive victims.
How emotionally disruptive would a victim's conduct have
to be before a court would hold that the victim's conduct inter-
fered enough to deny a defendant a fair trial? Suppose in a
murder trial members of the victim's family sat in the front row
of the spectators' gallery throughout the trial wearing large but-
tons with a picture of the deceased victim. Is this conduct so
inherently prejudicial that it deprives a defendant of a fair
trial? In Musladin v. Lamarque,125 the Ninth Circuit reversed
the defendant's conviction on the above facts, concluding that
the spectators' courtroom conduct was inherently prejudicial to
the defendant. Yet, the next year in Carey v. Musladin,126 the
123. See Mosteller, supra note 107, at 1699-1700. See, e.g., Lanham v. Com-
monwealth, 171 S.W.3d 14, 32 (Ky. 2005) (upholding trial court decision refusing
to move victims attending the trial out of the sight of the jury when they began to
cry during a photo presentation).
124. See 150 CONG. REc. S4260, 4264 (Statement of Sen. Kyl) ("Obviously,
everyone in the courtroom has to behave. The judge can throw anybody out if they
do not behave or if they express emotions or try to communicate w/ the jury. That
is not the issue.").
125. 427 F.3d 653, 656-58 (2005).
126. 549 U.S. 70 (2006).
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Supreme Court reversed the Ninth Circuit's decision. 127 In a
concurring opinion, Justice Kennedy stated that there was in-
sufficient showing that the defendant's conviction was obtained
in a trial tainted by an atmosphere of coercion or
intimidation. 128
3. Where should victims sit in the courtroom?
Where the victim sits in the courtroom requires a consider-
ation of whether crime victims should be treated more like wit-
nesses or parties. Should a crime victim sit in the spectator
gallery unless called to testify, at the prosecutor's table, or
should a third table be added in the courtroom along with prose-
cution and defense tables? If crime victims were treated more
like parties, would that be more likely to influence the jury prej-
udicially in violation of the defendant's right to a fair trial? The
CVRA is silent concerning the preferred or appropriate location
for the victim to sit during those proceedings in which the vic-
tim is permitted to attend. Of the eight rights provided in the
CVRA, the victim's right to be reasonably heard and to confer
with the government's attorney is central to the question of
where the victim should sit in the courtroom. As discussed ear-
lier, the victim's right to be heard in the district court is limited
to proceedings involving release, plea, sentencing, or parole.129
The answers to these questions probably will vary depending on
the proceeding.
While the majority of states do not permit the victim to sit
at counsel table, a few states have determined that it is permis-
sible. An Alabama statute provides victims the right to sit at
counsel table with the prosecutor. 130 In an Alabama case, a vic-
127. Justice Thomas, writing for the Court, held that the Ninth Circuit im-
properly concluded that the California Court of Appeals unreasonably applied
clearly established Federal Law. Id. (citing 28 U.S.C. 2254(d)(1) (1948)).
128. Id. See also Ducote v. State, 873 A.2d 1099 (Del. 2005) (victim hugging
victim support counselor after her testimony in view of the jury was inappropriate,
but cured by the judge's cautionary instruction); State v. Boone, 820 P.2d 930
(Utah Ct. App. 1991) (victim's wife making exclamations such as "that's not true!"
in the courtroom did not interfere enough to deny defendant a fair trial).
129. See 18 U.S.C. § 3771(a)(4) (2004).
130. See ALA. CODE § 15-14-53 (1983) ("The victim of a criminal offense shall
be entitled to be present in any court exercising any jurisdiction over such offense
and therein to be seated at counsel table of any prosecutor prosecuting such of-
fense .... ").
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tim was permitted to sit at counsel table where she began to cry
during testimony describing the autopsy of her murdered hus-
band. 131 The court found that the victim's crying did not consti-
tute behavior that would violate the defendant's constitutional
right to a fair trial. 132 In a California case, the California Court
of Appeals permitted a victim to sit at counsel table, but quali-
fied its decision in order to retain a clear dividing line between
witness and party status and to prevent prejudicial trial prac-
tices. 33 On the other hand, Louisiana expressly prohibits vic-
tims from sitting at counsel table. 134
Other practical issues might arise when there are multiple
victims. How should the court determine which victims deserve
a seat in the well of the court? With multiple victims, there is
also a risk of creating dissention among victims who might feel
excluded or neglected if one victim or group of victims is given
special treatment.
C. Plea Agreements, Guilty Pleas, and Sentencing
Proceedings
Plea agreements have been a source of victim dissatisfac-
tion, complaint, and litigation. Victims' rights advocates believe
that plea agreements reached between prosecutors and defend-
ants are sometimes inappropriate and that an injustice occurs
when cases are resolved without the victims' knowledge or par-
ticipation. Defense attorneys complain that plea agreements
are violated when victims recommend a sentence greater than
the one the prosecutor has agreed to recommend to the court,
131. Crowe v. State, 485 So. 2d 351, 362-63 (Ala. Crim. App. 1984).
132. Id. at 363.
133. State v. Ramer, 21 Cal. Rptr. 2d 480, 484 (Ct. App. 1993) ("[W]e do not
wish this opinion to be viewed as approving of the practice of permitting a victim to
sit with a prosecutor at the counsel table. At a criminal trial at which the victim
testifies, the victim is a witness and not a party to the case .... The court should
not, in our view, allow a seating arrangement which treats a witness, even a key
witness, as if the witness were a party to the case.... We do recognize, that the
presence of the victim at the counsel table does increase the possibility of both
emotional and jury focus on factors which may not be consistent with the jury trial
process involved in assessing criminal guilt.").
134. See LA. CODE EVID. ANN. art. 615 (2000) ("The court shall also enter such
other order as may appear reasonably necessary to preserve decorum and insure a
fair trial, provided that the victim shall not be allowed to sit at the counsel table.").
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sometimes with the prosecutor's full knowledge and
encouragement.
Under the CVRA, victims have the right to reasonably con-
fer with the prosecutor concerning plea agreements. 135 A limi-
tation of this right is the CVRA's provision that "[niothing in
this chapter shall be construed to impair the prosecutorial dis-
cretion of the Attorney General or any officer under his direc-
tion."136 In In re W.R. Huff Asset Management Co., a group of
crime victims petitioned for a writ of mandamus, seeking to va-
cate a settlement agreement in a forfeiture action.137 One of the
victims' arguments was that the government did not adequately
consult with them before entering into the settlement agree-
ment as required by the CVRA, section 3771(a)(5).138 In re-
jecting this claim, the Second Circuit stated: "Nothing in the
CVRA requires the Government to seek approval from crime
victims before negotiating or entering into a settlement
agreement." 39
The CVRA also provides that victims have a right to be
heard at any public proceeding involving pleas and sentencing.
The CVRA does not address the question of when the victim
must be heard. However, Kyl, Twist, and Higgins argue that, to
be effective, the right to be heard must allow the victim to ad-
dress the judge before the judge exercises discretion to accept or
reject a plea. 140
When there are multiple defendants sentenced at the same
trial, does the crime victim have a right to be heard at the sen-
tencing of each defendant? Kenna v. U.S. Dist. Court (In re
Kenna) arose out of a dispute over the right of a victim to be
heard when the judge had already heard from that victim re-
garding a different defendant.' 4 ' The defendants, a father and
135. See 18 U.S.C. § 3771(a)(5) (2004). The source of this right is in the Vic-
tims' Rights and Restitution Act of 1990. One of its "Bill of Rights" is "to confer
with the attorney for the Government in the case." 42 U.S.C. § 10606(b)(5).
136. 18 U.S.C. § 3771(d)(6).
137. 409 F.3d 555, 560-61 (2d Cir. 2005).
138. Id. at 561.
139. Id. at 564.
140. See Kyl et al., supra note 2, at 603.
141. 435 F.3d 1011, 1013. (9th Cir. 2006). In Kenna v. United States Dist.
Court (In re Kenna), 453 F.3d 1136, 1136-37 (9th Cir. 2006), the Ninth Circuit
rejected this argument and denied mandamus relief to the victim who claimed that
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son, defrauded numerous victims in an investment scheme and
several victims spoke at the father's sentencing. 142 When the
son was sentenced three months later, the court denied the vic-
tims the opportunity to speak, ruling that the victims had been
heard at the previous sentencing, and there was nothing the
victims could say that would impact the court's sentence. 143 The
Ninth Circuit granted the petition for mandamus filed by one of
the victims.144 Determining that the statute "is ambiguous as to
what it means for crime victims to be heard," the Ninth Circuit,
after reviewing the legislative history and finding a congres-
sional intent to give crime victims the right to speak at proceed-
ings covered by the CVRA, held that the right to be heard at any
public proceeding involving sentencing "means that the district
court must hear from the victims, if they choose to speak, at
more than one criminal sentencing." 45 The Ninth Circuit left it
to the district court to decide whether it should conduct a new
sentencing hearing. 46
Under what circumstances is the crime victims' right to be
heard at plea and sentencing hearings satisfied by submission
of written statements rather than being heard in person? 47
Cassell argues that the term "reasonably" should be narrowly
interpreted to allow for alternative methods of communicating a
victim's views to the court when the victim is unable to attend
the proceedings. 148 Other situations, however, may justify the
receipt of written statements. For example, in cases involving a
very large number of crime victims, courts have leeway to fash-
ion reasonable procedures in a way that does not unduly compli-
cate or prolong the proceedings. 49
the prosecution's unwillingness to disclose the defendant's presentence report vio-
lated his rights under the CVRA.
142. In re Kenna, 435 F.3d at 1012-13.
143. Id. at 1012-13.
144. Id. at 1018.
145. Id. at 1015, 1016.
146. See id. at 1017-18.
147. Cf. United States v. Marcello, 370 F. Supp. 2d 745, 746-50 (N.D. Ill. 2005)
(holding that the victim's right to be heard at a pretrial release hearing could be
accommodated through written statements, and the victim was not entitled to ap-
pear in person before the court).
148. See Cassell, Recognizing Victims, supra note 95, at 890.
149. See 18 U.S.C. §3771(d)(2) (2004).
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In United States v. Degenhardt, the court concluded that
while the phrase "to be reasonably heard" is ambiguous, the leg-
islative history "makes it clear that the CVRA created a right to
be heard in person."150 The court also stated that the victim's
right to speak is mandatory and not subject to the discretion of
the court, unless such a large number of victims are involved
that the effective functioning of the court would be impaired. 15'
A controversial issue is whether crime victims are entitled
to have access to the presentence report, including statements
in the report made by the defendant. Crime victims' rights ad-
vocates argue that because the CVRA provides for the right of
crime victims to make sentencing impact statements, there is a
need for victims to view the defendants' pre-sentencing report
statements in order to be adequately prepared. The crime vic-
tim may be the only person with first-hand knowledge of the
circumstances of the crime who may be able to refute the defen-
dant's allegations. Also, victim rights' advocates may argue
that the overarching right to be treated with "fairness" and with
respect for the victim's "dignity" justify victim access to the
presentence report.152
Defense advocates may argue that defendants have a right
under the Sixth Amendment's Confrontation Clause, 53 and as a
matter of fundamental fairness under the Due Process Clause,
to view and challenge crime victims' written or oral sentencing
statements. If defendants have a Confrontation Clause right,
this may also include the right of cross-examination.1M In re-
sponse, similar to a defendant's right to allocute at sentencing,
crime victims' advocates may argue that crime victims are not
functioning as "witnesses" testifying against defendants, and
therefore defendants have no confrontation rights in this con-
text. If a crime victim is provided access to a defendant's
presentence report statements, defense counsel could argue
that a defendant is entitled to similar access to the crime vic-
tim's statements, absent compelling privacy interests.
150. 405 F. Supp. 2d 1341, 1346 (D. Utah 2005).
151. Id. at 1343-45.
152. See 18 U.S.C. § 3771(a)(8).
153. See Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36 (2004).
154. See Wood, supra note 69, at 8.
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In In re Kenna, the Ninth Circuit found that the victim in a
fraud case did not demonstrate that his reasons for requesting
the presentence report outweighed the confidentiality that
should be given to the report. 155 The victim filed a petition for
writ of mandamus under the CVRA seeking an order requiring
the district court to release to the victim the entire presentence
report.15 6 The Ninth Circuit held that there is no support "in
either the language of the statute or the legislative history" for
the proposition that the CVRA conferred a general right for
crime victims to have access to presentence reports. 157
The CVRA provides that crime victims have "(t)he right to
full and timely restitution as provided in law."158 This provision
interacts with existing restitution statutes. Does the CVRA
provide an additional right that restitution be "full" and
"timely"? In United States v. Sacane, the victims, a group of
investment funds, moved for an order requiring more detailed
financial disclosures from the defendant in advance of a restitu-
tion hearing. 59 They claimed that they needed to inspect the
presentence report in order to enforce their CVRA right to full
and timely restitution. 60 The district court denied the request,
holding that the CVRA does not provide a right to disclosure of
the presentence report.' 6' The Court stated that if the victims
believed that additional financial disclosure was necessary,
they may pursue their CVRA right to enlist the assistance of
the government. 162
155. 453 F.3d 1136, 1137 (9th Cir. 2006) (per curiam).
156. Id.
157. Id. See also In re Brock, No. 08-1086, 2008 U.S. App. LEXIS 2104 (4th
Cir. Jan 31, 2008) (per curiam); United States v. Citgo Petroleum Corp., No. C-06-
563, 2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 57686 (S.D. Tex. Aug. 8, 2007); United States v. Sa-
cane, No. 3:05-cr-325, 2007 U.S. Dist LEXIS 22178 (D. Conn. March 28, 2007).
158. 18 U.S.C. § 3771(a)(6) (2004).
159. 2007 U.S. Dist LEXIS 22178, at *2.
160. Id. at *2-3.
161. Id. at *4, 8.
162. Id. at *6. 18 U.S.C. §3771(c)(1) states: "Officers and employees of the
Department of Justice and other departments and agencies of the United States
engaged in the detection, investigation, or prosecution of crime shall make their
best efforts to see that crime victims are notified of, and accorded, the rights de-
scribed in subsection (a)."
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D. Right to be Present and Heard at Parole Hearings
The CVRA specifically provides crime victims the right to
reasonable, accurate, and timely notice of any parole proceed-
ing.163 Additionally, they have the right to attend and be rea-
sonably heard at any parole proceeding. 16 In a recent federal
case applying Michigan's version of the CVRA, the district court
denied the defendant's due process claim that the parole board's
reliance on victim statements violated the defendant's constitu-
tional rights.165 Because Michigan's provision protects victim
privacy, the victim's statements were kept confidential, and the
defendant had no knowledge of what was asserted and conse-
quently had no opportunity to rebut the claims in front of the
parole board. 66 The court reasoned that because the defendant
had no liberty interest in parole, the defendant's rights had not
been violated. 167 If this case had been decided under the CVRA,
the result likely would have been the same, since the basis of
the decision was the defendant's diminished rights after
conviction.
E. Overarching Rights: Right to be Treated with Fairness
and Respect for Dignity and Privacy
The CVRA provides crime victims with "[t]he right to be
treated with fairness and with respect for the victim's dignity
and privacy." 68 This right is not easily classified into discrete
stages of the criminal proceeding, and to a greater extent than
the other enumerated rights in the CVRA, the applicability of
this general right will likely be defined by courts as they inter-
pret the statute in specific situations. However, this right has
already influenced the Rules Committee responsible for propos-
ing amendments to the United States Supreme Court.
In a recent set of proposed amendments to the Federal
Rules, crime victims' right to fairness, dignity, and privacy was,
in part, a basis for recommendations that victims' personal in-
163. 18 U.S.C. § 3771(a)(2).
164. Id. § 3771(a)(4).
165. Palmer v. Granholm, No. 1:06-cv-301, 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 45333, at
*29 (W.D. Mich. July 5, 2006).
166. Id. at *4.
167. Id. at *10-13.
168. 18 U.S.C. § 3771(a)(8).
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formation not be disclosed in the case of an alibi defense, vic-
tims be notified and given an opportunity to quash subpoenas
issued on third parties seeking information about crime victims,
and the convenience of victims be considered in determining the
place of the trial. 169 In proposing these changes, the Committee
stated that it "sought to incorporate, but not go beyond, the
rights created by the statute.' 70 These changes were adopted
by the Supreme Court and submitted to Congress on April 23,
2008, effective December 1, 2008.171
Proponents of these broad rights for victims equate them
with due process rights and seek to import the due process
framework of fundamental fairness. 72 Senator Kyl, one of the
primary legislative sponsors of the CVRA, stated: "The broad
rights articulated in this section are meant to be rights them-
selves and are not intended to just be aspirational. One of these
rights is the right to be treated with fairness. Of course, fair-
ness includes the notion of due process." 73
It remains unclear if courts will accept this characteriza-
tion. While defendants' due process rights are predicated on po-
tential deprivation of life, liberty, or property, victims have
none of these at stake in the criminal process. 174 There is no
169. See COMMITTEE ON RULES OF PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE OF THE JUDICIAL
CONFERENCE OF THE UNITED STATES, PROPOSED AMENDMENTS TO THE FEDERAL
RULES OF BANUuPrcy AND CRIMINAL PROCEDURE, AND THE FEDERAL RULES OF Evi-
DENCE 349-75 (2006); Cassell, Treating Crime Victims Fairly, supra note 95; Fed-
eral Rulemaking: Rules Published for Comment, 1998, http://www.uscourts.gov/
rules/newrulesl.html. Other provisions of the CVRA are also applicable. For ex-
ample, the crime victim's right to attend public proceedings may be substantially
impacted by the court's determination of the place of the trial. See 18 U.S.C.
§ 3771 (a)(3).
170. COMMITTEE ON RULES OF PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE, supra note 169, at
350.
171. See Amendments to the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure, April 23,
2008, available at http://www.supremecourtus.gov/orders/courtorders/frcr08p.pdf.
172. See Cassell, Recognizing Victims, supra note 95, at 858-59.
173. Id. at 859 (quoting 150 Cong. Rec. S4269 (statement of Sen. Kyl)).
174. There is some debate about whether the victim's right to restitution rep-
resents a property interest and, therefore, should afford the victim due process in
determining restitution. For example, in United States v. Lay, 456 F. Supp. 2d
869 (S.D. Tex. 2006), when Ken Lay's estate moved to have his conviction vacated
ab initio following his death, a victim moved the court to deny the motion, because
his statutory right to restitution constituted a property interest, and vacating the
conviction would result in a loss of that property. Id. at 871-72. The court denied
the motion and vacated the conviction, noting that abatement is the equivalent of
never having been convicted. Id. at 873.
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obvious limit to the circumstances that could trigger a victim's
right to be treated with fairness and dignity and, likewise, little
limit on the interpretations different courts may embrace.
In United States v. Heaton, the prosecutor charged the de-
fendant with attempting to entice a minor into unlawful sexual
activity. The prosecutor then sought leave to dismiss the
charge without prejudice. 175 The district judge stated that it
would make its own determination whether dismissal is war-
ranted, that the victim's right to be treated with fairness and
dignity extends to the court's decision of whether to dismiss an
indictment, and that, unlike other rights in the CVRA, this
right is not limited to "public proceedings."'176 The judge then
ordered the government to consult with the victim and inform
the court "that the victim has been consulted on the dismissal
and what the victim's views were on the matter."1 77
V. Enforcement of Victims' Rights
A. CVRA's Enforcement Remedies: Standing, Fast-Track
Appeal, Mandatory Appellate Review, Authorized
Stay of Proceedings, and Written Record, if
Relief Denied
A principal goal of the victims' rights movement, reflected
in the drafting of the CVRA, is to develop an effective judicial
enforcement regime so that victims' rights can be meaningfully
exercised. The enactment of the CVRA's remedies granting
crime victims standing along with an expedited right of appeal
and the resulting nascent development of appellate case law are
the CVRA's most important contributions to the advancement
of crime victims' rights.
What has been most lacking in state constitutional amend-
ments and federal and state legislation are meaningful enforce-
ment mechanisms.178 Without adequate remedies, victims
cannot exercise their rights when prosecutors or trial judges
175. United States v. Heaton, 458 F. Supp. 2d 1271, 1271 (D. Utah 2006). See
also United States v. Patkar, No. 06-00250, 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 6055 (D. Haw.
Jan. 28, 2008); United States v. Kaufman, No. 04-40141-01, 2005 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
21006 (D. Kan. Oct. 17, 2005).
176. Heaton, 458 F. Supp. 2d at 1272.
177. Id. at 1272-73.
178. See sources cited supra note 8.
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deny them. In the legislative history of the CVRA, Senators
Feinstein and Kyl make clear that providing victims with an
enforcement mechanism to initiate review of alleged violations
of victims' rights is an essential component of the legislation. 179
According to Professor Beloof, there are three main obsta-
cles to turning victims' illusory rights into real rights: "(1) gov-
ernment discretion to deny rights, (2) lack of a meaningful
remedy to enforce rights, and (3) appellate court discretion to
deny review." 80 Only eight states provide standing to crime
victims to seek legal redress for a violation of their rights.' 8 '
179. See 150 Cong. Rec. S4270 (Apr. 22, 2004) (statement of Sen. Feinstein)
("This provision is critical for a couple of reasons. First, it gives the victim standing
to appear before the appellate courts of this country and ask for review of a possi-
ble error below. Second, while mandamus is generally discretionary, this provision
means that courts must review these cases. Appellate review of denials of victims'
rights is just as important as the initial assertion of a victim's right. This provision
ensures review and encourages courts to broadly defend the victims' rights."). See
also id. (statement of Sen. Kyl) ("For a victim's right to truly be honored, a victim
must be able to assert the rights in trial courts, to then be able to have denials of
those rights reviewed at the appellate level, and to have the appellate court take
the appeal and order relief. By providing for all of this, this bill ensures that vic-
tims' rights will have meaning.").
180. See Beloof, The Third Wave, supra note 8, at 258. See also discussion
supra part III.B.4.
181. Eight states provide crime victims with standing to appeal: Arizona, In-
diana, Maryland, Michigan, Nevada, South Carolina, Texas, and Utah. Maryland
specifically gives victims standing by statute to file an application for leave to ap-
peal interlocutory or final orders when their legal rights are violated at trial, but
prohibits the ability to stay a criminal proceeding. Maryland Rule 8-111(c), effec-
tive January 1, 2008, provides: "Although not a party to a criminal or juvenile
proceeding, a victim of a crime or a delinquent act or a victim's representative may:
(1) file an application for leave to appeal to the Court of Special Appeals from an
interlocutory or a final order under Code, Criminal Procedure Article, § 11-103 and
Rule 8-204; or (2) participate in the same manner as a party regarding the rights of
the victim or victim's representative." In Maryland v. Hoile, 948 A.2d 30 (2008),
the Court of Appeals held that an assault victim, who successfully filed and argued
a motion to vacate reconsideration of defendant's sentence based on an asserted
denial of her statutory rights to be notified, attend, and be heard at sentence re-
consideration hearings, was entitled to participate in briefing and oral argument
before the Court of Appeals. The court reasoned, however, that since the applica-
tion for appeal does not stay other proceedings in a criminal case, unless all parties
consent, there is no effective tangible remedy for a victim to seek to "un-do" what
already has been done in a criminal case, including the right to seek invalidation of
an otherwise legal sentence. Id. at 52. Indiana and Utah also prohibit the ability
of a victim to stay a criminal proceeding. See IND. CODE ANN. § 35-40-2-1 (West
2004); UTAH CODE ANN. § 77-38-11 (West 1994). South Carolina's Constitution
and Utah law provide the closest enforcement provisions to the CVRA. In South
Carolina, the state constitution allows victims to seek review through a writ of
41
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Review by traditional writ of mandamus is discretionary with
federal and state appellate courts 8 2 and is an unlikely avenue
for routine review of violations of crime victims' rights.
The CVRA establishes a new statutory review mecha-
nism-although the CVRA uses the traditional label of a writ of
mandamus-that includes: (1) standing for crime victims to ap-
peal a violation of their rights immediately after the violation
occurs to federal appellate courts; (2) a mandatory review by an
appellate court; (3) a fast track time schedule, requiring that
the appellate court take up and decide the case within seventy-
two hours after a petition has been filed; (4) a stay or continu-
mandamus. See S.C. CONST. art. I, § 24 ("The rights created in this section may be
subject to a writ of mandamus, to be issued by any justice of the Supreme Court or
circuit court judge to require compliance by any public employee, public agency,
the State, or any agency responsible for the enforcement of the rights and provi-
sions of these services contained in this section, and a willful failure to comply with
a writ of mandamus is punishable as contempt."). Utah also allows victims to
bring actions for declaratory relief or for mandamus. See UTAH CODE ANN. § 77-
38-11 ("Adverse rulings on these actions or on a motion or request brought by a
victim of a crime or a representative of a victim of a crime may be appealed under
the rules governing appellate actions, provided that no appeal shall constitute
grounds for delaying any criminal or juvenile proceeding."). Utah also allows vic-
tims to file amicus briefs in cases affecting their interests. Id. The Texas Consti-
tution provides that a "victim... has standing to enforce the rights enumerated in
this section but does not have standing to participate as a party in a criminal pro-
ceeding or to contest the disposition of any charge." TEx. CONST. art. I, § 30. The
remedy described in the Arizona statute resembles mandamus by allowing victims
to bring a special action to mandate enforcement of their enumerated rights. See
ARiz. REV. STAT. ANN. § 13-4437 (1992) ("The victim has standing to seek an order
to bring a special action mandating that the victim be afforded any right or to
challenge an order denying any right guaranteed to victims under the victims' bill
of rights . . . ."). Similarly, the Nevada Constitution permits a victim to initiate an
action to compel public officials to comply with victims' rights. See NEV. CONST.
art. 1, § 8(4) ("A person may maintain an action to compel a public officer or em-
ployee to carry out any duty required by the legislature pursuant to subsection
2."). Subsection 2 outlines the rights afforded to crime victims in Nevada. See
NEV. CONST. art. 1, § 8(2). A Michigan statute limits victim appeals to cases in-
volving parole board decisions granting parole to prisoners. See MICH. COMP. LAWS
§ 791.234(11) (1982) ("The action of the parole board in granting a parole is appeal-
able by the prosecutor of the county from which the prisoner was committed or the
victim of the crime for which the prisoner was convicted. The appeal shall be to
the circuit court in the county from which the prisoner was committed, by leave of
court.").
182. A writ of mandamus is typically discretionary and usually reserved for
extraordinary situations when a "superior court must compel a lower court or gov-
ernment officer to perform mandatory or purely ministerial duties correctly."
BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 712 (8th ed. 2004); see also FED. R. App. P. 21.
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ance of the proceedings below for up to five days while the ap-
peal is being heard; and (5) a written opinion clearly stating the
reasons for denial, if the court of appeals denies the relief
sought. 183
The CVRA states:
Motion for Relief and Writ of Mandamus. The rights described
... shall be asserted in the district court in which a defendant is
being prosecuted for the crime or, if no prosecution is underway,
in the district court in the district in which the crime occurred.
The district court shall take up and decide any motion asserting a
victim's right forthwith. If the district court denies the relief
sought, the movant may petition the court of appeals for a writ of
mandamus. The court of appeals may issue the writ on the order
of a single judge pursuant to circuit rule of the Federal Rules of
Appellate Procedure. The court of appeals shall take up and de-
cide such application within 72 hours after the petition has been
filed. In no event shall proceedings be stayed or subject to a con-
tinuance of more than five days for purposes of enforcing this
chapter. If the court of appeals denies the relief sought, the reasons
for the denial shall be clearly stated on the record in a written
opinion. 184
Thus, the CVRA authorizes crime victims to independently
assert their rights granted by the CVRA and to be represented
by an attorney. 8 5 The Government may also independently as-
sert these rights on behalf of the crime victims. 8 6 In addition,
the federal district judges are directed to ensure that crime vic-
tims are afforded these rights "[i]n any court proceeding involv-
ing an offense against a crime victim."18 7
There are some instances when staying proceedings for up
to five days may infringe upon the defendant's constitutional or
statutory rights. For example, suppose a crime victim believes
that his or her rights were violated by a trial judge's denial of
183. 18 U.S.C. § 3771(d)(3) (2004).
184. Id. (emphasis added). The "Writ of Mandamus" under the CVRA differs
markedly from the discretionary common law Writ of Mandamus.
185. See 18 U.S.C. § 3771(d)(1) ("Rights: The crime victim or the crime vic-
tim's lawful representative and the attorney for the Government may assert the
rights described in subsection (a).").
186. See id.
187. Id. § 3771(b).
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the right to be reasonably heard at a pretrial release hearing. 88
The victim files an appeal to the appellate court, which grants a
stay of a few days. If the defendant can show that this stay
affected his or her liberty interests or ability to prepare a de-
fense, there may be a basis for a due process claim. Also, a de-
lay may violate the defendant's right, under Rule 5(a) of the
Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure, to be taken before a judi-
cial officer without unnecessary delay and may also affect the
computation of the defendant's rights under the Speedy Trial
Act.189
B. Limitations of CVRA's Enforcement Remedies
The CVRA prohibits the award of damages. The CVRA
states:
No Cause of Action. Nothing in this chapter shall be construed to
authorize a cause of action for damages or to create, to enlarge, or
to imply any duty or obligation to any victim or other person for
the breach of which the United States or any of its officers or em-
ployees could be held liable in damages. 190
However, during the floor debate on the CVRA, Senator Leahy
expressed a preference for a damages remedy over the use of a
mandamus mechanism, fearing that victims' assertions of a de-
nial of fairness or respect in the criminal process could "be diffi-
cult claims to adjudicate.' 191
Another limitation of the CVRA enforcement mechanism is
the statutory language limiting remedies that may affect the in-
dependent role of the public prosecutor: "Nothing in this chap-
ter shall be construed to impair the prosecutorial discretion of
the Attorney General or any officer under his direction."1 92
188. See discussion of United States v. Turner, 367 F. Supp. 2d 319 (E.D.N.Y.
2005) supra notes 101-03 and accompanying text.
189. The Speedy Trial Act, 18 U.S.C. §§ 3161-3174 sets time limits for com-
pleting the various stages of a federal criminal prosecution.
190. 18 U.S.C. § 3771(d)(6).
191. 150 CONG. REC. S4260, 4271 (2004) (statement of Senator Leahy) ("I note
with some regret that S. 2329 [CVRAI picks up language from S.J. Res. 1 [proposed
constitutional amendment] denying victims any cause of action for damages in the
event that their rights are violated. Allowing victims to vindicate their rights
through separate proceedings for damages instead of through mandamus actions
in the criminal case could well be a more efficient as well as a more effective way of
ensuring that victims' rights are honored.").
192. 18 U.S.C. § 3771(d)(6).
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In addition, there are limitations on voiding or vacating
certain hearings or procedures and redoing or reopening
them.193 The CVRA states:
Limitation on Relief. In no case shall a failure to afford a right
under this chapter provide grounds for a new trial. A victim may
make a motion to re-open a plea or sentence only if-(A) the vic-
tim has asserted the right to be heard before or during the pro-
ceeding at issue and such right was denied; (B) the victim
petitions the court of appeals for a writ of mandamus within 10
days; and (C) in the case of a plea, the accused has not pled to the
highest offense charged. 194
The CVRA's limitation that crime victims and prosecutors
may not seek a new trial as a remedy for a violation of victims'
rights is buttressed by federal-and state-constitutional pro-
tections for defendants under the Double Jeopardy Clause. 95
The Double Jeopardy Clause insures that the Federal govern-
ment and the states may not undertake multiple prosecutions
against a defendant for the same offense. Double jeopardy at-
taches at trial when the jury is selected and sworn or when the
first witness is sworn in a non-jury trial. Thus, the Double
Jeopardy Clause prevents the voiding of trials and re-
prosecution.
There are limited exceptions when the Double Jeopardy
Clause does not bar a retrial or a reconsideration of the verdict,
such as when the defendant seeks and obtains a mistrial or
when the defendant appeals and the court orders a retrial. The
only way for the state to get a retrial after a mistrial is "mani-
fest necessity." 96 Beloof observes that "the denial of a trial at-
tendance right does not necessarily result in prejudice to
victims or the state in the crucial sense that the absence of a
193. The right to reopen or redo a particular proceeding has been referred to
as "the superior remedy." Beloof, The Third Wave, supra note 8, at 304.
194. 18 U.S.C. § 3771(d)(5).
195. The Double Jeopardy Clause of the Fifth Amendment of the United
States Constitution states: "nor shall any person be subject for the same offence to
be twice put in jeopardy of life or limb." U.S. CONST. amend. V. In Benton v. Mary-
land, 395 U.S. 784, 794 (1969), the Supreme Court held that the Double Jeopardy
Clause applies to the states as a result of its incorporation into the due process
clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.
196. Illinois v. Somerville, 410 U.S. 458, 462-463 (1973) (manifest necessity
requires prejudice either to the defendant or the state).
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victim is likely to alter the result of the trial."1 97 He concludes
that "presently it is unlikely that manifest necessity can be the
basis for voiding a trial when a victim's right to attend is vio-
lated."198 While a retrial is unlikely, a victim does have the
right to pursue an expedited interlocutory appeal-included in
the CVRA's definition of a "writ of mandamus"-until the trial
is over. 199
Double jeopardy does not bar voiding and reconsidering cer-
tain pretrial and post-trial proceedings as a remedy for a viola-
tion of victims' rights. For example, the Double Jeopardy
Clause does not bar reconsideration of the victims' rights to no-
tice and to be heard at pretrial release hearings, or of a release
order as a remedy for failure to notify a crime victim of the
scheduling of a parole or release hearing.
What are the consequences when a motion to reconsider a
plea or sentence is granted? The procedure is unclear. Does the
defendant have a right to withdraw the plea and seek to renego-
tiate a plea agreement? Does the prosecutor have a right to re-
negotiate a plea agreement? Voiding an entire proceeding may
result in rejecting all evidence presented in that proceeding and
starting anew. An alternative is to vacate the result without
voiding the original proceeding. At the reconsideration hearing,
a crime victim can exercise his or her right to be heard and the
judge will then void, modify, or affirm the prior ruling or or-
der.200 After the victim(s) is given the opportunity to be heard,
the defendant and government arguably should be allowed to
respond.
C. Conflict among the Federal Circuits of the Standard for
Review to Issue a Writ of Mandamus
Although a crime victim has standing to immediately ap-
peal an alleged violation of the crime victim's CVRA rights
197. Beloof, The Third Wave, supra note 8, at 308.
198. Id. at 309. However, Beloof suggests it is possible that a victim's pres-
ence might actually change the outcome of the trial when a victim hears something
that she knows to be false in the trial and is able to reveal the truth. If the parties
are unaware of the falsehood, a victim may be the only one capable of revealing it.
Id.
199. See Kenna v. United States (In re Kenna), 435 F.3d 1011, 1015-16 (9th
Cir. 2006).
200. See Beloof, The Third Wave, supra note 8, at 305.
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along with the mandatory right to have the appeal heard on an
expedited basis by a federal appellate court, a conflict exists
among the appellate courts as to whether the applicable legal
standard for granting a requested writ of mandamus should be
discretionary or mandatory when the trial court's order reflects
an abuse of discretion or legal error. Congress may have created
the uncertainty by naming the appellate remedy a "writ of man-
damus," the name of a common law, discretionary judicial
remedy.201
In a Fifth Circuit case, In re Dean,20 2 an explosion at a re-
finery operated by the defendant, BP Products North America
Inc., killed fifteen and injured more than 170 persons. 20 3 The
Department of Justice filed a sealed ex parte motion, prior to
bringing any criminal charges, seeking an order from the dis-
trict court excusing the government from the requirement of no-
tifying crime victims until after a plea agreement had been
signed.20 4 The government argued that: (1) notification to vic-
tims in advance of the public announcement of a plea was im-
practical because of the large number of victims, and (2) media
coverage of a potential criminal disposition could impair the
plea negotiation process and might prejudice the case if no plea
were reached. 20 5 The district court, on the same day, signed an
ex parte order granting the government's motion.20 6 After the
defendant signed the plea agreement and pled guilty, all vic-
201. See In re Antrobus, 519 F.3d 1123 (10th Cir. 2008) (discussing the appel-
late standard of review under the CVRA). The court stated:
Congress could have drafted the CVRA to provide for "immediate appellate
review" or "interlocutory appellate review," something it has done many
times. Instead, it authorized and made use of the term "mandamus."
"[W]here Congress borrows terms of art in which are accumulated the legal
tradition and meaning of centuries of practice, it presumably knows and
adopted the cluster of ideas that were attached to each borrowed word in the
body of learning from which it was taken and the meanings its use will con-
vey to the judicial mind unless other instructed."
Id. at 1124 (citations omitted) (quoting Morissette v. United States, 342 U.S. 246,
263 (1952)).
202. 527 F.3d 391 (5th Cir. 2008) (per curiam).
203. United States v. BP Prods. N. Am. Inc., No. H-07-434, 2008 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 12893, at *3 (S.D. Tex. Feb. 21, 2008).
204. In re Dean, 527 F.3d at 392.
205. Id.
206. Id. at 395.
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tims who wished to be heard, either personally or through coun-
sel, were permitted to speak at a plea hearing. 207
Twelve of the victims asked the district court to reject the
plea agreement, alleging, inter alia, that the ex parte proceed-
ings violated the CVRA and that they were denied the "reasona-
ble right to confer with the attorney for the Government in the
case."208 While the district court acknowledged that CVRA
rights may apply before any prosecution is underway, it denied
the request.20 9 The victims then petitioned the Fifth Circuit for
a writ of mandamus, seeking a reversal and a remand with "in-
structions that the plea agreement not be accepted and the par-
ties are permitted to proceed as they determine - so long as it
is in a way that respects crime victims' rights."210 Within sev-
enty-two hours, a Fifth Circuit panel granted the mandamus
petition in part, directing the district court to "take no further
action to effect the plea agreement, pending further order and
awaiting additional briefing."211
On appeal, the parties disputed the standard of review.
The victims argued that ordinary appeal standards apply
rather than the stricter standards for obtaining a writ of man-
damus. 212 The Fifth Circuit recognized that decisions of the
Second and Ninth Circuits supported the victims' position.213 In
Kenna, Judge Kozinski observed: "The CVRA creates a unique
regime that does, in fact, contemplate routine interlocutory re-
view of district court decisions denying rights asserted under
the statute.... [W]e must issue the writ whenever we find that
the district court's order reflects an abuse of discretion or legal
error. '21 4 The Third Circuit, in an unpublished decision, also
agreed with the Second and Ninth Circuits.21 5
207. Id. at 393.
208. Id. at 392. See Scott Campbell, Stephanie Roper, Wendy Preston,
Louarna Gillis, and Nila Lynn Crime Victims' Rights Act, supra note 4.
209. In re Dean, 527 F.3d at 393.
210. Id. at 392.
211. Id. at 393.
212. Id. at 393-94.
213. Id. at 394 (citing Kenna v. United States Dist. Court (In re Kenna), 435
F.3d 1011, 1017 (9th Cir. 2006); In re W.R. Huff Asset Mgmt., 409 F.3d 555, 563
(2d Cir. 2005)).
214. In re Kenna, 435 F.3d at 1017.
215. See In re Walsh, No. 06-4792, 2007 U.S. App. LEXIS 9071 (3rd Cir. Apr.
19, 2007).
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The Fifth Circuit, however, disagreed with this standard,
holding that a writ of mandamus may issue only if: "(1) the peti-
tioner has 'no other adequate means' to attain the desired relief;
(2) the petitioner has demonstrated a right to the issuance of
the writ that is 'clear and indisputable;' and (3) the issuing
court, in the exercise of its discretion, is satisfied that the writ
is 'appropriate under the circumstances.'"216 The court found
support from the Tenth Circuit, which recently held that the
discretionary standard for mandamus applied: "[Miandamus is
a well worn term of art in our common law tradition. '217
Applying this three-prong standard, the Fifth Circuit held
that the third-prong-a writ of mandamus must be "appropri-
ate under the circumstances"-was not met, despite finding
that the district court, with the best of intentions, misapplied
the law.218 The district court's use of ex parte proceedings had
no precedent and was contrary to the provisions of the CVRA.219
Yet, the court found that, despite the trial judge's error, the vic-
tims were notified, although much too late in the process, and
were allowed "substantial and meaningful participation" at the
plea hearing.220 The court concluded:
We are confident, however, that the conscientious district court
will fully consider the victims' objections and concerns in deciding
whether the plea agreement should be accepted. The decision
whether to grant mandamus is largely prudential. We conclude
that the better course is to deny relief, confident that the district
court will take heed that the victims have not been accorded their
full rights under the CVRA and will carefully consider their objec-
tions and briefs as this matter proceeds. 221
Subsequently, the U.S. Supreme Court denied an application
for stay of enforcement of the judgment of the Fifth Circuit.222
216. In re Dean, 527 F.3d at 394 (quoting In re United States, 397 F.3d 274,
282 (5th Cir. 2005)).
217. Id. at 394 (quoting In re Antrobus, 519 F.3d 1123, 1127 (10th Cir. 2008)).
218. Id. at 394-95.
219. Id. Since the third-prong of the mandamus standard was not met, the
court stated that is was unnecessary to decide whether the first two prongs of the
mandamus standard were met. Id. at 394.
220. Id. at 395.
221. Id.
222. Dean v. U.S. Dist. Court, 128 S. Ct. 2996 (2008).
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Accordingly, the Second, Third, and Ninth Circuits have
adopted a pro-victim standard of review to determine when a
writ of mandamus should be issued. Their view is that the
CVRA contemplates routine review of trial court decisions deny-
ing -victims' rights when a court's order reflects an abuse of dis-
cretion or legal error. The Fifth and Tenth Circuits, however,
have viewed the writ of mandamus in the common law tradition
that allows appellate courts broad discretion whether to issue a
writ of mandamus when crime victims' rights have been vio-
lated. This conflict among the circuit courts on such an impor-
tant issue merits consideration either by the U.S. Supreme
Court or Congress.
VI. Conflict Between the CVRA and the Equal
Administration of Justice
An unavoidable conflict exists between the interests of
crime victims and the equal administration of justice. The prin-
ciple of the equal administration of justice requires that persons
committing similar crimes with similar criminal histories and
backgrounds generally should be treated in a like manner.
Professors Strang and Sherman view the conflict from the
crime victim's perspective:
From a victim's perspective, traditional criminal justice fails pre-
cisely because it must treat all similar offenses in similar ways,
regardless of the differential impact of the offense on different vic-
tims. Attempts to create consistency for offenders may produce
gross inconsistencies for victims, with costs of crime distributed
unequally in ways that are far more emotional and powerful than
is generally assumed. 223
From the defendant's perspective, providing crime victims
a significant participatory role in criminal proceedings echoes
back to injustices of the colonial period when alleged crime vic-
tims played a dominant role in criminal prosecutions through a
system of private prosecution. Howley and Dorris state:
During colonial times, crime victims were integral to the criminal
process. The victim could pay the sheriff to pursue and arrest the
defendant, and then the victim hired the prosecutor. There was no
223. Heather Strang & Lawrence W. Sherman, Repairing the Harm: Victims
and Restorative Justice, 2003 UTAH L. REV. 15 (2003).
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need to provide separate rights for victims, because they were so
closely involved in the pursuit of justice. In contrast, our found-
ing fathers had great interest in the rights of criminal defendants,
who had been powerless under the English system of jurispru-
dence. Such a system of private prosecution was flawed, however,
confining 'justice' largely to those who could afford it. The crimi-
nal justice system therefore evolved into a system of public prose-
cution. The prosecutor represents the state. 224
In response, crime victim advocates argue that crime vic-
tims are the ones who suffer direct harm both from the crime
itself and secondary harm inflicted by the criminal trial pro-
cess.225 They seek to re-balance the criminal justice system so
that crime victims may exercise limited trial participation
rights and not be merely marginalized as witnesses. The CVRA
gives crime victims "a voice, not a veto."226
A. Conflict Between Victims' Rights and the Equal Treatment
of Similarly Situated Defendants
Professor Beloof, former Director of the National Crime
Victim Law Institute, acknowledges that the ascendancy of the
victims' rights movement leads to unequal treatment of simi-
larly situated defendants:
Unequal treatment of defendants is perhaps the most compelling
reason for denying victims the right to participate, because equal
treatment of defendants stands against victim participation at
virtually every stage of the criminal process. As a practical mat-
ter, however, equality of treatment of defendants has largely
failed as an obstacle to laws of victim participation. Ascendant is
the victim's choice to participate in the criminal process, descen-
dant is equal treatment among similarly situated defendants.227
Beloof explains that unequal treatment of defendants oc-
curs because victims are permitted to choose whether or not to
informally or formally influence decision makers concerning
charging or disposition, including the choice to assist either the
224. Susan Howley & Carol Dorris, Legal Rights for Crime Victims in the
Criminal Justice System, in VICTIMS OF CRIME 299 (Robert C. Davis, Arthur J.
Lurigio, & Susan A. Herman, eds., 3d ed. 2007).
225. See supra note 3 and accompanying text.
226. Kyl et al., supra note 2, at 622.
227. Beloof, The Third Wave, supra note 8, at 298 (emphasis added).
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prosecutor or the defense attorney, both, or neither: "One defen-
dant may face a victim who seeks mercy, while another defen-
dant may face a victim who seeks a severe sanction. A third
defendant may find that the victim is not participating in the
criminal process except as a witness."228
B. Unequal Treatment of Victims: Privileged and
Disadvantaged Victims
The CVRA and other state victims' rights constitutional
amendments and statutes may be contributing to the further
separation of victims into two broad classes depending upon
their interest and ability to take advantage of victim rights,
namely, privileged and disadvantaged victims.
To the extent that sophisticated victims exercise their
rights and victims lacking the skills or financial means fail to
assert their rights, there is a risk that prosecutors will begin to
anticipate which class of victims is most likely to exercise their
rights. As a result, defendants may potentially face varying
charges, pleas, or sentences based on the victims' characteris-
tics and likelihood of involvement. From the defendants' per-
spective, criminal prosecution may become something akin to a
lottery. Based on the victim's race, gender, social status or level
of education, defendants may face outcomes of varying severity.
Decisions involving prosecutorial discretion, such as charg-
ing, plea bargaining, and sentencing recommendations, are sus-
ceptible to political and public influence as well. In many
instances crime victims justifiably receive a tremendous out-
pouring of sympathy from the public. Public sympathy for vic-
tims, however, can sometimes depend on the gender, race, and
economic status of the victim. 229 This combination of public at-
tention, based on the emotional appeal and selective involve-
ment of the victim, has the potential to disproportionately
interfere with the prosecutors' task of trying to produce a just
outcome. 230
228. Id.
229. See David Hancock, A Tale Of Two Kidnappings, CBS NEWS, June 20,
2002, http://www.cbsnews.com/stories/2002/06/20/national/main512915.shtml.
230. See Stephen J. Schulhofer, The Trouble with Trials; the Trouble with Us,
105 YALE L.J. 825 (1995) (reviewing GEORGE P. FLETCHER, WITH JUSTICE FOR
SOME: VICTIMS' RIGHTS IN CRIMINAL TRILs (1995)).
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VII. Potential Conflict Between the CVRA and the
Independence of Public Prosecutor
The United States Supreme Court defined the role of the
public prosecutor in 1935 in Berger v. United States, as follows:
The United States Attorney is the representative not of an ordi-
nary party to a controversy, but of a sovereignty whose obligation
to govern impartially is as compelling as its obligation to govern
at all; and whose interest, therefore, in a criminal prosecution is
not that it shall win a case, but that justice shall be done. As
such, he is in a peculiar and very definite sense the servant of the
law, the twofold aim of which is that guilt shall not escape or in-
nocence suffer. He may prosecute with earnestness and
vigor-indeed, he should do so. But, while he may strike hard
blows, he is not at liberty to strike foul ones. It is as much his
duty to refrain from improper methods calculated to produce a
wrongful conviction as it is to use every legitimate means to bring
about a just one. 231
Professor Bennett Gershman contends that implementing
the prosecutor's duty to "do justice"232 requires that "a prosecu-
tor, in making official decisions and judgments, behave not as a
partisan for any particular constituency, but, rather, in a man-
ner that is neutral to each constituency." 233 He argues that the
prosecutor does not represent a private client, including the
crime victim; rather, a prosecutor's "clients" are "the people who
live in the prosecutor's jurisdiction, including police, witnesses,
crime victims, and even the accused."234
Gershman's concern is that a prosecutor's relationship with
a crime victim may violate a prosecutor's duty of neutrality and
create an actual or apparent conflict of interest. As an example,
he states, "[T]o the extent that a prosecutor allows the victim to
play a substantial and influential role in critical discretionary
231. 295 U.S. 78, 88 (1935).
232. The "do justice" standard, the accepted standard for defining the prose-
cutor's role, has been adopted by every state. See e.g., MODEL RULES OF PROF'L
CONDUCT R. 3.8 cmt. 1 (1983); MODEL CODE OF PROF'L RESPONSIBILITY EC 7-13(3)
(1980); ABA Standards for Criminal Justice, Standard 3-1.2(c) (1993); Nat'l Prose-
cution Standards, Standard 1.1 (1991). These standards do not specifically ad-
dress a prosecutor's ethical responsibilities to crime victims.
233. Bennett L. Gershman, Prosecutorial Ethics and Victims' Rights: The
Prosecutor's Duty of Neutrality, 9 LEWIS & CLARK L. REV. 559, 562 (2005).
234. Id. at 563.
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decisions-charging, plea bargaining, and sentencing-the
prosecutor may violate the duty of neutrality."235
Gershman acknowledges that the prosecutor's obligation to
behave neutrally does not mean that a prosecutor should be in-
different to the harm committed against a crime victim. He
states:
Indeed, a prosecutor should feel personally outraged at such con-
duct, and if morally convinced of the defendant's guilt, is allowed,
and indeed, obligated, to advocate that view zealously by any law-
ful and ethical means. A prosecutor does not serve justice, how-
ever, when she undertakes her official functions for personal or
political reasons, has an "ax to grind" against the defendant, or
has a special motivation to favor the victim or satisfy a victim's
private agenda if that agenda is inconsistent with the prosecutor's
public duty to serve all the people neutrally, i.e., equally and
fairly.236
Walker A. Matthews argues that balancing the interests of
the victim against those of society creates an ethical conflict of
interest that cannot be reconciled. 237 Victims are understanda-
bly most interested in their case and the fate of the defendant
that caused them harm. The prosecutor, however, must bal-
ance a variety of interests, including liberty and due process,
public order and safety, and governmental economy and
efficiency.238
Matthews illustrates this conflict with an example in which
the defendant causes harm to a victim while committing several
armed robberies.23 9 Of available punishments, the victim will
likely seek something toward the maximum permitted under
the particular statute. The prosecutor, however, must consider
alternative punishments based on notions of equal administra-
tion of justice, public safety, and governmental efficiency.
Hence, the prosecutor may choose lesser punishments than
those envisioned by the victim because other persons guilty of
235. Id. at 564.
236. Id. at 562-563. See also Marshall v. Jerrico, Inc., 446 U.S. 238, 248
(1980); Wright v. United States, 732 F.2d 1048, 1056 (2d Cir. 1984).
237. See Walker A. Matthews, III, Note, Proposed Victims' Rights Amend-
ment: Ethical Considerations for the Prudent Prosecutor, 11 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS
735 (1998).
238. Id. at 745.
239. Id. at 746.
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the same crime and with similar records were not punished as
harshly. In addition, the prosecutor may have an opportunity
to negotiate a plea bargain whereby a lenient sentence is of-
fered in exchange for information concerning other crimes and
the capture of accomplices, thus improving public safety and
promoting governmental efficiency.240 Such decisions might be
interpreted as anti-victim, but are essential to properly execut-
ing the duties of a prosecutor. Matthews believes that while
prosecutors may be aware of possible victim influence on their
decisions, natural tendencies to sympathize with victims would
undoubtedly affect their judgment. 241
The CVRA-and state constitutions and statutes with simi-
lar provisions-at a minimum, sends mixed messages to a con-
scientious prosecutor. First, the CVRA provides crime victims
with a "reasonable right to confer with the attorney for the Gov-
ernment in the case," which presumably applies at all stages of
the prosecution of the accused. 242 Crime victims desiring to ex-
ercise their CVRA trial rights are likely to attempt to influence
prosecutor decision-making when prosecutors have critically
important discretionary choices to make, such as those concern-
ing pre-trial release, charging, pleas, and sentencing. Inter-
ested victims may threaten or actually use their CVRA rights to
be "reasonably heard at any public proceeding in the district
court involving release, plea, sentencing. .". ."243 Privileged vic-
tims may use their resources to hire a private attorney,244 who
may influence a prosecutor's exercise of discretion, use or
threaten to use the media, and employ private investigative
resources.
245
240. Id.
241. See id. at 744 (arguing that implementation of victims' rights may re-
quire the prosecutor to become the de facto representative of the victim and might
affect the prosecutor's ability to make impartial decisions because of an uncon-
scious priority placed on victim interests).
242. 18 U.S.C. § 3771(a)(5) (2004).
243. Id. § 3771(a)(4).
244. See 18 U.S.C. § 3771(d)(1) (providing that a victim's lawful representa-
tive may assert the crime victim's rights); 18 U.S.C. § 3771(c)(2) ("The prosecutor
shall advise the crime victim that the crime victim can seek the advice of an attor-
ney with respect to the rights described in subsection(a).").
245. See, e.g., State v. von Bulow, 475 A.2d 95 (R.I. 1984) (victim's family
hired a private attorney and undertook their own investigation).
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Second, the CVRA encourages prosecutors to become
spokespersons and representatives of crime victims. It provides
that the attorney for the Government may assert any of the
crime victims' rights along with the crime victim. 246 The CVRA
imposes on the officers and employees of the Department of Jus-
tice a duty to "make their best efforts to see that crime victims
are notified of, and accorded all of their rights."247
Third, the CVRA encourages, but does not require, prosecu-
tors to become agents of crime victims in the event of an appeal
of a violation of a crime victim's rights: "In any appeal in a crim-
inal case, the Government may assert as error the district
court's denial of any crime victim's right in the proceeding to
which the appeal relates."248
Fourth, the CVRA requires that the Attorney General "pro-
mulgate regulations to enforce the rights of crime victims and to
ensure compliance by responsible officials with the obligations
described in law respecting crime victims." 249 The Attorney
General is required to designate an administrative authority
within the Department of Justice to "receive and investigate
complaints relating to the provision of violation of the rights of
a crime victim." 250 In addition, the Attorney General must "re-
quire a course of training for employees and offices of the De-
partment of Justice that fail to comply with provisions of
Federal law pertaining to the treatment of crime victims .... ,"251
The Attorney General's regulations shall "contain disciplinary
sanctions, including suspension or termination from employ-
ment, for employees of the Department of Justice who willfully
or wantonly fail to comply with provisions of Federal law per-
taining to the treatment of crime victims." 252
Fifth, the CVRA authorizes five categories of funds for the
Department of Justice and, as to one category, also to States
and tribal governments, to implement various provisions of the
CVRA.2 53
246. 18 U.S.C. § 3771(d)(1).
247. Id. § 3771(c)(1).
248. Id. § 3771(d)(4).
249. Id. § 3771(f)(1).
250. Id. § 3771(f)(2)(A).
251. Id. § 3771(f)(2)(B).
252. Id. § 3771(f)(2)(C).
253. 18 U.S.C. § 1404(D)(b)(1)-(5).
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These detailed provisions, taken together, appear to reflect
a Congressional purpose to forge a closer relationship between
prosecutors and crime victims. On the other hand, the CVRA
includes two provisions designed to protect prosecutors from the
undue influence of crime victims. First, the CVRA may not be
construed "to authorize a cause of action for damages or to cre-
ate, to enlarge, or to imply any duty or obligations to any victim
or other person for the breach of which the United States or any
of its officers or employees could be held liable in damages."254
Second, "Inlothing in this chapter shall be construed to impair
the prosecutorial discretion of the Attorney General or any of-
ficer under his direction." 255
Did Congress, intentionally or not, create or encourage an
environment in which prosecutorial independence is likely to be
compromised? Will the CVRA have the likely effect of pressur-
ing prosecutors to behave as partisans for a particular constitu-
ency, crime victims? Does the CVRA provide prosecutors with
"a special motivation to favor the victim or satisfy a victim's pri-
vate agenda if that agenda is inconsistent with the prosecutor's
public duty to serve all the people neutrally, i.e., equally and
fairly?"256 In sum, does the CVRA create additional sources of
pressure that may affect the prosecutor's ability to "do justice,"
especially in situations when the law enforcement interests of
the prosecutor and the victims' interests do not coincide?
The increased role of the victim in the criminal justice sys-
tem during the last twenty-five years and the recent enactment
of the CVRA, with its path breaking judicial enforcement reme-
dies and an administrative framework that encourages
prosecutorial compliance, suggest a need for organizations, such
as the American Bar Association, the Department of Justice,
and the National District Attorneys Association, to review their
standards and guidelines that address a prosecutor's ethical re-
sponsibilities to crime victims in relation to their responsibili-
ties as law enforcement officers and to other criminal justice
participants .257
254. 18 U.S.C. § 3771(d)(6).
255. Id.
256. Id.
257. Id. See supra note 232 (identifying some of the sources of criminal justice
standards and guidelines). The American Bar Association is in the process of up-
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Specific standards and guidelines should support the fed-
eral and state prosecutors' historically independent role so elo-
quently articulated by the Supreme Court in Berger v. United
States.258 For example, Arizona provides that in the event of a
conflict of interest between a prosecutor and crime victim, the
prosecutor has the responsibility to direct the victim to the "ap-
propriate legal referral, legal assistance, or legal aid agency."259
At the state and local level, an even greater need exists for
the development of more specific standards and guidelines.
While federal prosecutors are appointed by the U.S. Attorney
General, state prosecutors are typically elected and must stand
for re-election when their terms end, which often are for rela-
tively short periods of time. State prosecutors, usually repre-
senting smaller population groups, are subject to more pressure
at the local level than Federal prosecutors. A tendency to side
with victim interests might become commonplace as more vic-
tims, whose interests are associated with maintaining the good-
will of the community, become active participants in the
criminal justice system.
From the crime victims' perspective, the above discussion
does not undercut the need or rationale for granting crime vic-
tims independent, meaningful participatory rights in the crimi-
nal justice system. Ironically, the independent role of the public
prosecutor affirms the need for meaningful victims' rights. It is
because of the tradition of prosecutorial independence that
prosecutors cannot be counted on to protect victims' rights.
There is no guaranty or assurance that a prosecutor's interest
will not conflict with a crime victim's interest. For example, a
prosecutor and a defense attorney may agree upon a plea bar-
gain that the crime victim opposes. In this situation, both the
government's and defendant's interests are adverse to the vic-
dating its Standards for Criminal Justice, Prosecution Function. Also, the Na-
tional District Attorneys Association is in the process of updating its National
Prosecution Standards.
258. See supra note 232 and accompanying text.
259. Aaiz. R. CRIM. P. 39(c)(3) (2008) ("In any event of any conflict of interest
between the state or any other prosecutorial entity and the wishes of the victim,
the prosecutor shall have the responsibility to direct the victim to the appropriate
legal referral, legal assistance, or legal aid agency.").
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tim's interest in exercising the right to speak in court in opposi-
tion of the plea agreement. 260
Victim advocate Beloof agrees that "prosecutorial control of
victims' rights provides fertile ground for ethical conflicts of in-
terest."261 Beloof observes:
It is a mistake to define the state and victims as nonadversaries
simply because both are harmed by the criminal act and share an
interest in punishment. Adversariness exists when prosecutors
violate victims' rights. Moreover, the public prosecutor is obli-
gated to the public interest. When the public interest and victims'
rights coincide, perhaps no conflict exists. However, when there
is a conflict, the prosecution cannot reasonably be expected to de-
fend victims' rights.262
The provisions of the CVRA discussed above increase the
potential for ethical conflicts of interest and add to the pressure
on prosecutors to shift their role from that of law enforcement
officer toward victim advocate. Prosecutors have a responsibil-
ity to develop rules, standards, and guidelines, supported by ap-
propriate training and supervision, to ensure integrity in the
exercise of prosecutorial discretion. The courts need to exercise
the utmost diligence to ensure that defendants' rights are fully
protected when, as frequently occurs, prosecutor and victim in-
terests are closely aligned.
VIII. Conclusion
The Crime Victims' Rights Act (CVRA) of 2004 is a seminal
contribution to advancing crime victims' rights through the cre-
ation of a new judicial enforcement regime. In addition to pro-
viding crime victims with a number of trial participation rights,
the CVRA provides an overarching right to be "treated with
fairness and with respect for the victim's dignity and privacy"263
that has been equated by some victim advocates as creating a
general "due process" right. As crime victims receive better
treatment and greater respect, their cooperation with police,
prosecutors, and judges is likely to increase.
260. See Douglas E. Beloof, The Third Wave, supra note 8, at 337.
261. Id.
262. Id.
263. 18 U.S.C. § 3771(a) (2004).
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A significant benefit of the CVRA's judicial enforcement re-
gime is the development of a new body of case law, interpreting
and applying victims' rights and setting standards to guide the
conduct of trial judges, prosecutors, defense attorneys, and
other criminal justice officials. Some of these new cases decided
by the trial and appellate courts reflect the challenge of inter-
preting and applying the CVRA's general, sometimes ambigu-
ous language, with little legislative history for guidance.
The CVRA's benefits are not without criminal justice sys-
tem costs. Crime victims' rights, as applied, may conflict with a
defendant's statutory, due process and other constitutional
rights. A conflict also exists between crime victims' rights and
the equal administration of justice requiring that persons com-
mitting similar crimes with similar criminal histories and back-
grounds generally should be treated in a like manner. Crime
victims can choose, for example, whether to seek revenge,
mercy, or forego exercising their rights. Further, as the CVRA
seeks to forge a closer relationship between prosecutors and
crime victims, there is a risk that the traditional role of the in-
dependent, public prosecutor may shift from that of law enforce-
ment officer toward victim advocate.
Congressional sponsors intended that the CVRA's rights
and remedies serve as a model for the states. If equivalent pro-
visions to the CVRA are eventually enacted and implemented
by the states, as intended, a revolution in criminal procedure
will have been achieved. Crime victims would be accommo-
dated, not as equals, but as participants with rights and the
ability to enforce those rights.
The proponents of a victims' rights constitutional amend-
ment are monitoring the implementation of the CVRA by prose-
cutors, judges and others. If the CVRA does not effect the
change proponents are seeking, crime victims' rights advocates
have promised to renew their drive for an amendment to the
U.S. Constitution.
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